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COMMENT
Injury by Accident in Workers' Compensation:
Alternatives to an Outmoded Doctrine
In the winter of 1975 Thomas Pulley was employed by the Migrant and
Seasonal Farmworkers Association as a job counselor and relocator. 1 As part
of his job he helped move clients' household possessions into homes near new
job sites. On January 28 Pulley was on his job moving kitchen furniture from
the back of a truck to the porch of a client's house. As Pulley stooped and
attempted to pick up a 500 pound refrigerator "'a catch caught [him] in the
back and the refrigerator slid down onto the porch.' "2 He went to a doctor
that night, and the injury was diagnosed as an acute intervertebral disc rup-
ture. Pulley had surgery three weeks later that left him with a ten percent
permanent disability of the back. His subsequent application for workers'
compensation benefits was contested. At the initial Industrial Commission3
claim hearing before a single deputy Pulley testified that he had moved similar
refrigerators before, and that nothing unusual had occurred at the time of the
injury except the sustaining of the injury itself. Benefits were denied on the
ground that Pulley did not sustain an injury by accident as required by North
Carolina's Workers' Compensation Act.4
Pulley appealed to the full Industrial Commission. After examining the
evidence, the Commission added a finding that "'[als the plaintiff was picking
up his side of the refrigerator, it slipped and he got a catch in his back.' "5 The
Commission then concluded, upon the facts in the amended record, that Pul-
ley had sustained an injury by accident and consequently was entitled to com-
pensation. 6
On appeal, the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that Pulley had not
sustained an injury by accident and was not entitled to benefits after all.7 The
court said the case was controlled by the well-established North Carolina rule
that an injury caused by an unexpected external event, such as a slip, is an
1. Pulley v. Migrant & Seasonal Farmworkers Ass'n, 30 N.C. App. 94, 95, 226 S.E.2d 227,
228 (1976).
2. Id (quoting Industrial Commission hearing record).
3. The North Carolina Industrial Commission is the executive agency charged with ad-
ministering the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-1 to -122
(1979). Id § 97-77. Claims for benefits are first ruled on by a Commission claims deputy. Id
§ 97-84. Upon proper appeal, the full Commission must review the initial decision. Id § 97-85.
The. Commission's findings of fact are conclusive. Appeals for errors of law may be made to the
North Carolina Court of Appeals. Id § 97-86.
4. Pulley v. Migrant & Seasonal Farmworkers Ass'n, 30 N.C. App. 94, 95, 226 S.E.2d 227,
228 (1976).
5. Id (quoting Industrial Commission findings of fact). Industrial Commission decisions
are not reported. The full Commission has the power to amend the findings of a hearing deputy
and to reverse the initial decision. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-85 (1979).
6. 30 N.C. App. at 95, 226 S.E.2d at 228.
7. Id at 97, 226 S.E.2d at 229.
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injury by "accident," but an injury that results from performing ordinary job
duties in the usual way is not an injury by "accident."8 After reviewing the
record the court struck the amended finding because it concluded that, in the
true sequence of events, Pulley first had injured his back and then let the re-
frigerator slip.9 The court explained that Pulley had not sustained an injury
by "accident" because the balance of the record did not reveal that the injury
had a fortuitous external cause, but rather that Pulley had been injured while
performing his usual job in his usual way.10 If, on the other hand, Pulley had
slipped with the refrigerator first and then sustained the injury, instead of sus-
taining the injury first and then slipping, he would have incurred a compensa-
ble "injury by accident."'I
The phrase "injury by accident" is part of the North Carolina Workers'
Compensation Act's 12 critical compensation formula, which requires "injury
by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment."' 13 An injury
is not compensable unless it meets that full statutory requirement.' 4 Pulley v.
Migrant & Seasonal Farmworkers Association ' 5 is a good illustration of the
North Carolina construction of the "injury by accident" component of the
statute. In general, the construction distinguishes between the concepts of ac-
cidental cause and accidental result.' 6 To be an injury by accident the injury
must be more than the unexpected result ofjob activity (the accidental result);
the injury must also have had an unexpected external cause (the accidental
cause). Although the court has never expressly so stated, it would appear that
under its interpretation the statutory component thus serves as an extra causa-
tion test to ensure that compensation is awarded for only those injuries that
are truly work related.17 The test is based upon a presumption that work re-
latedness is less likely if an injury does not have an external cause, and it
operates arbitrarily to deny compensation when an injury does not have such a
cause, even if the injury may in fact have been work related. The extra causa-
tion requirement applies to all injuries, but it is not often an issue in compen-
sation claims because most industrial injuries are clearly caused by unexpected
external events associated with employment. The "injury by accident" re-
quirement becomes crucial, however, in claims for injuries that are often asso-
ciated with natural degenerative body conditions, such as heart attacks and
8. Id at 96-97, 226 S.E.2d at 229. See text accompanying notes 128-38 infra.
9. 30 N.C. App. at 96, 226 S.E.2d at 228-29.
10. Id at 97, 226 S.E.2d at 229.
11. A slip that leads to injury is a fortuitous external cause. See Rice v. Thomasville Chair
Co., 238 N.C. 121, 76 S.E.2d 311 (1953). See also Robbins v. Bossong Hosiery Mills, Inc., 220
N.C. 246, 17 S.E.2d 20 (1941) (a fall is an "accident").
12. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-2(6), -52 (1979).
13. Id § 97-2(6). The compensation formula is found in the definitions section of the Act as
part of the basic definition of the word "injury." Id
14. Conrad v. Cook-Lewis Foundry Co., 198 N.C. 723, 153 S.E. 266 (1930).
15. 30 N.C. App. 94, 226 S.E.2d 227 (1976).
16. See note 53 and accompanying text infra.
17. The injury by accident external cause requirement can be said to test causation because it
is arguably more likely that an injury was actually caused by work if it was produced by an
external cause. See text accompanying note 149 infra.
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hernias, which frequently occur without obvious external events, such as heart
attacks and hernias. It is the difficulty of determining causation for some of
these types of injuries that provides the rationale for employment of the extra
"injury by accident" causation requirement.
This Comment will examine the origins of the injury by accident rule, its
justifications and the well-deserved criticisms that have been directed against
the rule. Finally, proposals for reform will be presented. The current rule
needs prompt change, so that deserving claimants like Pulley will have a fair
chance to recover compensation.
I. ENGLISH WORKERS' COMPENSATION AND THE INJURY BY
ACCIDENT- REQUIREMENT
Workers' compensation systems were enacted in Europe and England in
the last half of the nineteenth century to alleviate the often desperate plight of
industrial workers who had suffered work-related injuries but could not re-
cover damages.' 8 Operating under a basic principle that responsibility for
work-related injuries should be assigned to working conditions and not to per-
sonal fault, workers' compensation laws imposed liability without fault on em-
ployers for losses due to employment injuries. 19 The cost of injury
compensation was to be treated as a cost of production that ultimately would
be distributed to society in the form of increased prices.20 It was hoped that
the new systems would ensure that workers received prompt and certain com-
pensation for their injuries. 2 1
England passed a workers' compensation act in 1897.22 .Using a now fa-
18. See Larson, The Nature and Origins of Workmen's Compensation, 37 CORNELL L.Q. 206
(1952), in which the origin of workers' compensation is traced. The number ofindustrial accidents
greatly increased in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In order to recover damages at
common law, however, workers had the often difficult task of establishing employer fault and
overcoming several defenses. It has been estimated that in the United States only 15% of injured
workers ever recovered for job-related injuries under the common law. NATIONAL COMMISSION
ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAws, COMPENDIUM ON WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 11
(1973) [hereinafter cited as COMPENDIUM].
One early response to this problem was enactment of employers' liability statutes. These
statutes limited the availability of defenses, but were generally very narrow in scope. They were
not an attempt to create a new system of liability. See id at 13-14. Dissatisfaction with limited
reforms led to enactment of workers' compensation schemes. Germany adopted the first modem
compensation system in 1884. Several European countries, including England in 1897, followed
suit. The workers' compensation movement began at a later date in the United States. New York
adopted the first system of general application in 1910. By 1920 42 jurisdictions had enacted
workers' compensation legislation. See id at 14-18.
19. See E. CHERT, INJURY AND RECOVERY IN THE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT 12 (1961). This
new approach was necessitated, in part, by the advent of the modem factory system and the in-
creasing level of technology. Industrial injuries were frequently unavoidable and resulted from
the methods of carrying on business and not from the fault of the employer. Id
20. See Vause v. Vause Farm Equip. Co., 233 N.C. 88, 63 S.E.2d 173 (1951). See also COM-
PENDIUM, supra note 18, at 21-26.
21. Litigation of damage claims under the common law was wasteful and unpredictable.
Awards were inconsistent, uncertain and subject to high legal fees. See Bohlen, ,4 Problem in the
Drafting of Workmen's Compensation Acts, 25 HARV. L. REV. 328, 330-32 (1912).
22. Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897, 60 & 61 Vict., c. 37, §§ 1-10.
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mous phrase that was subsequently copied in most American jurisdictions, 23
the act declared that "if in any employment. . . personal injury by accident
arising out of and in the course of the employment is caused to a workman, his
employer shall. . . be liable to pay compensation."24 The injury by accident
component of the English statute received an authoritative and liberal inter-
pretation in the early case of Fenton v. J. Thorley & Co. 25 In Fenton the in-
jured worker had suffered an internal rupture while turning a wheel, an
activity that was part of his usual job duties.26 There was no indication that
the worker had slipped, although there was evidence that the wheel was miss-
ing a spoke. The employer contested the claim on the ground that the rupture
was not an injury by accident. 27 The employer argued that the statutory re-
quirement was not satisfied if the injury was only an unexpected result of em-
ployment activity and that an injury was not "by accident" unless it had an
unexpected external cause.28
The House of Lords rejected the employer's construction of the statute.
Lord Shand stated that the phrase "injury by accident" did not impose an
external cause requirement and that the unexpected sustaining of an injury
fully satisfied the statutory language.29 "Accident" was defined by Lord
Macnaghten as "an unlooked-for mishap or an untoward event which is not
expected or designed. ''30 Moreover, although the employer had cited insur-
ance cases in support of his position, the House of Lords distinguished these
cases as having little bearing on the proper construction of the statute.31 The
worker had argued in the alternative that, if the unexpected injury itself was
held not to constitute an injury by accident, an element of fortuitous external
cause was supplied by the unusual condition that the wheel was missing a
spoke.32 This approach was dismissed as unprofitable and unnecessary. 33 A
23. 1 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 6.10 (1973); 1B 'd § 37.10.
24. Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897, 60 & 61 Vict., c. 37, § I(1).
25. [1903] A.C. 443.
26. Id at 445.
27. Id
28. Id at 444. The employer argued that the "accident must be in the means by which the
result is brought about and not in the result itself." Id
29. Id at 451.
30. Id at 448. Lord Macnaghten continued:
If a man, in lifting a weight or trying to move something not easily moved, were to strain
a muscle, or rick his back, or rupture himself, the mishap in ordinary parlance would be
described as an accident. Anybody would say that the man had met with an accident in
lifting a weight, or trying to move something too heavy for him.
Id at 446. The words "by accident" were added, Lord Macnaghten reasoned, to ensure that
injuries that could be expected, such as those that were self-inflicted, would be excluded. Id at
448.
31. Id at 449-50. The different contexts of the legal problems, construing insurance contracts
on one hand and interpreting remedial legislation on another, bring different considerations into
play. Workers' compensation acts should be liberally construed. Id Insurance cases were of little
relevance in interpreting the Act, Lord Macnaghten said, because they turned on the meaning of
policy language carefully framed by insurers. Id
32. Id at 445.
33. Id It was stated that the nature of external conditions surrounding the injury did "not
affect the question in the least." Id
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later case reaffirming the Fenton holding stated that
[n]o doubt the ordinary accident is associated with something exter-
nal; the bursting of a boiler, or an explosion in a mine, for exam-
ple. . . . I think it may also be something going wrong within the
human frame itself, such as the straining of a muscle or the breaking
of a blood vessel.34
II. THE NORTH CAROLINA WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT AND THE
INJURY BY ACCIDENT REQUIREMENT
North Carolina passed its workers' compensation act in 1929.3 5 The
clause defining the scope of compensable injuries was taken verbatim from the
English act.36 Under the North Carolina statute every covered employer was
required to compensate his employees when they sustained "personal injury or
death by accident arising out of and in the course of [the] employ-
ment .... "37 The word "accident," however, was not defined in the act.38
The North Carolina Supreme Court adopted a liberal approach in its
early decisions construing the Act in general and the "injury by accident"
component of the recovery clause in particular. The court stated that the act
"should be liberally construed to the end that the benefits thereof should not
be denied upon technical, narrow and strict interpretation. '39 In the second
case decided under the Act, Conrad v. Cook-Lewis Foundry Co. ,40 the court
34. Clover, Clayton & Co. v. Hughes, [1910] A.C. 242, 246. In this case Lord Macnaghten
stated that "'injury by accident' meant nothing more than 'accidental injury."' Id at 248.
35. Law of March 11, 1929, ch. 120, 1929 N.C. Sess. Laws 117.
Workers' compensation came to North Carolina after a long and hard struggle. See J.
KEECH, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION IN NORTH CAROLINA (1942). The strict common law of
negligence prevailed for industrial injuries prior to passage of the Act, and virtually all previous
legislative attempts to modify the common-law rules had been failures. [d at 13-16.
In 1929, however, the political climate was more receptive to enactment of a workers' com-
pensation system. Some of the factors that helped create this atmosphere were the active efforts of
a pro-compensation governor, the increasing industrial growth of the state, favorable newspaper
opinion, the planning and lobbying of the North Carolina Conference for Social Service, and the
agreement of labor and management officials to unite and support a single compromise bill.
Widespread support of the compromise bill led to its enactment by a nearly unanimous vote. On
March 11, 1929 North Carolina became the forty-fourth state to enact a workers' compensation
statute. Id at 13-34.
The legislative history of the Act is well told in J. KEECH, supra. The only other source is
Henninger, Passing the North Carolina Workmen's Compensation Law, 36 Am. FEDERATIONIST
225 (1929).
36. See text accompanying note 24 supra.
37. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-3 (1979). The statute requires proof of five additional items when
compensation is sought for hernia. Id § 97-2(18); see note 187 infra.
38. In 1935, the statute was amended to provide for coverage of occupational diseases. Law
of March 26, 1935, ch. 123, §§ 1-3, 1935 N.C. Sess. Laws 130. The amendment provided a nega-
tive definition of the word "accident" by providing that "accident" should "not be construed to
mean a series of events in employment, of a similar or like nature, occurring regularly, continu-
ously or at frequent intervals in the course of such employment. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-52
(1979).
39. Johnson v. Asheville Hosiery Co., 199 N.C. 38, 40, 153 S.E. 591, 593 (1930). See also
Williams v. Thompson, 200 N.C. 463, 464, 157 S.E. 420, 430 (1931); Rice v. Denny Roll & Panel
Co., 199 N.C. 154, 157-58, 154 S.E. 69, 70-71 (1930).
40. 198 N.C. 723, 153 S.E. 266 (1930). In Conrad a claim was filed after the worker was shot
by a fellow employee. The court reached the liberal conclusion that the injury, upon the facts
19801
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defined the phrase "injury by accident" in broad and liberal terms as "an un-
looked for and untoward event which is not expected or designed by the per-
son who suffers the injury."41 This was the basic definition given in Fenton v.
Thorley.42 The court also stated that it would construe "injury by accident" in
a manner consistent with the statute's broad remedial purpose and that it
would not be bound by the law of negligence.43 In another early case, Mc-
Neely v. Carolina Asbestos Co.,44 the court reaffirmed the liberal Conrad defi-
nition and stated that the injury by accident requirement should be interpreted
"in its common sense every-day [sic] conception as referring to an injury pro-
duced without the design or expectation of the workman. '45 The court stated
that all accidental injuries except those occasioned by intoxication or wilful
intent should be compensable. 46 The North Carolina courts' early construc-
tion appears to have been clearly in line with the prevailing English view that
the injury by accident component required nothing more than an unexpected
injurious result and not an external cause. Although the courts' definition of
the phrase was susceptible to contrary interpretations47 and an injury by acci-
dent question had not been seriously raised in a case involving injury without
before it, did satisfy the requirements of the compensation formula, but remanded for a finding on
whether claimant's injury was occasioned by a prior wilful intent to injure the assailant. If the
injury had been so occasioned the award was improper. Id at 727-28, 153 S.E. at 269.
Conrad constituted the court's first occasion to construe the language of the Act's compensa-
tion formula-"injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment. ... N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 97-2(6) (1979). Examining the historical perspective of workers' compensation, the
court concluded that labor and management had struck a quid-pro-quo requiring liberal construc-
tion. The court stated that both workers and employers had
suffered under the old system, the employer by heavy judgments, . . . the employee
through old defenses or exhaustion in wasteful litigation. Both wanted peace. The
master in exchange for limited liability was willing to pay on some claims in the future
where in the past there had been no liability at all. The servant was willing not only to
give up trial by jury, but to accept far less than he had often won in court, provided he
was sure to get the small sum without having to fight for it.
198 N.C. at 725-26, 153 S.E. at 268 (quoting Stertz v. Industrial Ins. Comm'n, 91 Wash. 588, 590,
158 P. 256, 258 (1916)). The court gave liberal definitions to all components of the compensation
formula. The "arising out of" component was said to require some causal relationship between
work and injury, but te court stated that the cause need not have been forseeable when the injury
occurred. Id at 726, 153 S.E. at 269. To satisfy the "in the course of" component the worker had
to be performing his job at the proper time and place and under reasonable circumstances. Id at
727, 153 S.E. at 269.
41. 198 N.C. at 726, 153 S.E. at 268.
42. See text accompanying note 30 supra.
43. 198 N.C. at 725-26, 153 S.E. at 268.
44. 206 N.C. 568, 174 S.E. 509 (1934). McNeely involved a common-law action for damages
from exposure to asbestos dust. The trial judge had sustained a motion of nonsuit. The court
affirmed, holding that the injury was an "accident" compensable under workers' compensation
and that, consequently, the exclusive remedy was a compensation claim. Id at 575, 174 S.E. at
512-13. The action was brought before specific statutory provision was made for compensation of
occupational diseases and the McNeeol court's liberal determination that an occupational disease
could be an accident expanded coverage of the Act. Referring to the "injury by accident" require-
ment, the court also stated that "it is obvious that the word must not be used in its restricted and
technical sense, but in a wider and practical sense necessary to give workable effect to the proper
and just administration of the compensation law." Id at 573, 174 S.E. at 512.
45. Id at 575, 174 S.E. at 512-13.
46. Id
47. See note 53 and accompanying text infra.
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an obvious external cause,48 the courts clearly had adopted a liberal interpre-
tation of the "injury by accident" requirement.
In 1936, in Slade v. Willis Hosiery Mills, 49 however, the court changed
direction and rendered a very conservative definition of "injury by accident."
In Slade a claim was made for death from pneumonia following exposure to
heat and cold. The worker had been cleaning very hot dye machines on a hot
day, a job he had done before. The work involved hosing the machines with
water and collecting and carrying ashes outside. There was medical testimony
that the employment exposures caused the pneumonia, and the Commission
awarded compensation.50 The court reversed the award on the ground that
the injury was not an "injury by accident."51 In considering the definition of
"injury by accident," the court reaffirmed the Conrad and McNeely defini-
tions, then stated "[d]eath from injury by accident implies a result produced by
a fortuitous cause. . . . There must be an accident followed by an injury by
such accident . . before it is compensable under our statute."5 2 The Slade
court thus held that an injury could not be "by accident" unless it had a fortui-
tous external cause. Under the Slade rule the required accident can only be
found in an external event that causes the injury; the sustaining of the injury
does not itself satisfy the accident requirement. 53 The court said that the in-
jury was not caused by an external fortuitous event and therefore the worker's
death was not by accident.54
The Slade court introduced this far-reaching new rule in a very casual
manner. It did not acknowledge or announce that it was changing prior inter-
pretations nor did it give any reasons for the change. The only support
48. The supreme court decided its first two cases dealing with injuries that arguably lacked
an external cause shortly after McNeeil. Both injuries were of the type that are often related to
natural body degeneration. In both cases the court affirmed denials of awards, but the specific
question whether there had been an injury by accident was not discussed in either opinion. In
Moore v. Summers Drug Co., 206 N.C. 711, 175 S.E. 96 (1934), the Commission's denial of com-
pensation for heart attack because of lack of causal connection between work and injury was
affirmed as a binding finding of fact. Id at 713, 175 S.E. at 96. In Leggett v. Cramerton Mills, 206
N.C. 708, 175 S.E. 95 (1934), the Commission denied compensation for hernia because of lack of
causation and because of lack of an accident. The latter ground for denial is the first indication in
North Carolina that the "injury by accident" component might require more than the sustaining
of an unexpected injury. The court did not discuss or specifically approve of this ground. It
merely held that the Commission's findings were determinative. Id at 710, 175 S.E. at 96. Al-
though it had the opportunity, the court did not alter its liberal "injury by accident" rule in either
case. Both cases illustrate that the Act's causation requirements, exclusive of the currently restric-
tive "injury by accident" requirement, are effective in screening out nonemployment-related
claims.
49. 209 N.C. 823, 184 S.E. 844 (1936). Chief Justice Stacy wrote the opinion.
50. Id at 824, 184 S.E. at 844.
51. Id at 826, 184 S.E. at 845.
52. Id at 825, 184 S.E. at 845.
53. The Slade holding was possible because of the ambiguity of the original definition of an
"injury by accident" as an unlooked-for event. The required unlooked-for event could be further
defined as either an untoward cause or an untoward result. If the untoward result could be the
unlooked-for event, as was held in Fenton, then the sustaining of an unexpected injury would be
an "injury by accident." If, as the Slade court held, however, the unlooked-for event could only
be an external cause, something more than the unexpected result was necessary to meet the "in-
jury by accident" requirement.
54. 209 N.C. at 826, 184 S.E. at 845.
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presented for adoption of the new rule consisted of citations without discus-
sion to two North Carolina cases55 and to cases from other jurisdictions.5 6
Moreover, one of the North Carolina cases5 7 had involved the application of
insurance law, which, as was pointed out in Fenton v. J. Thorley & Co., consti-
tutes a poor guide for construction of workers' compensation legislation.58 Fi-
nally, the other North Carolina case does not stand for the proposition for
which it was cited,59 and none of the cases from other jurisdictions support
Slade's broad proposition that, to be compensable, all injuries must have for-
tuitous external causes. 60
The supreme court decided Neely v. City of Statesville6t eighteen months
after Slade. In Neely a claim was made for death by heart attack. The worker
had been assisting in and supervising the fighting of an intense fire when he
suddenly collapsed and died. Although the worker had a pre-existing heart
condition, medical testimony indicated that the proximate cause of death was
the employment-related excitement and compensation was awarded. 62 In a
cursory opinion the court reversed the award, stating that its decision was con-
55. Id at 825, 184 S.E. at 845 (citing Scott v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 208 N.C. 160, 179 S.E. 434(1935); Cabe v. Parker-Graham-Sexton Inc., 202 N.C. 176, 162 S.E. 223 (1932)).
56. Id at 825-26, 184 S.E. at 845 (citing Chop v. Swift & Co., 118 Kan. 35, 233 P. 800 (1925);
Hoag v. Kansas Independent Laundry Co., 113 Kan. 513, 215 P. 295 (1923); Ferris v. City of
Eastport, 123 Me. 193, 122 A. 410 (1923); Victory Sparkler & Specialty Co. v. Francks, 147 Md.
368, 128 A. 635 (1925); Lerner v. Rump Bros., 241 N.Y. 153, 149 N.E. 334 (1925)).
57. Scott v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 208 N.C. 160, 179 S.E. 434 (1935). In Scott a claim was
brought on an insurance policy that provided for benefits only if death resulted "'directly and
independently of all other causes from bodily injuries effected solely through external, violent,
and accidental means.'" Id at 164, 179 S.E. at 436. The court held that plaintiff could not re-
cover under the policy for death resulting from infection after an ordinary and skillfully per-
formed dental operation because death was not brought about by external accidental means. The
court discussed different methods of interpreting "accident" and concluded that an accident had to
be defined as an external cause. Id at 166-67, 179 S.E. at 438.
58. The House of Lords in Fenton had rejected insurance cases as a guide to construction of
the English Wqrkers' Compensation Act because of the widely differing policy contexts of the two
bodies of law. See note 31 and accompanying text supra. Indeed, the difference in the language
of the insurance contract construed in Scott, see note 57 supra, and the workers' compensation
formula interpreted in Slade, supports that argument.
59. In the cited case, Cabe v. Parker-Graham-Sexton, Inc., 202 N.C. 176, 162 S.E. 223 (1932),
the court affirmed an award for a miner's death from inhalation of poisonous air and gas. The
principal question was whether death had resulted from injury by accident, as the court ultimately
held, or from occupational disease. Id at 184, 162 S.E. at 228. The court did not discuss possible
distinctions between external cause and unexpected result.
60. With the exception of Victory Sparkler & Specialty Co. v. Francks, 147 Md. 368, 128 A.
635 (1925), the cases cited from other jurisdictions do support the limited proposition that unex-
pected external circumstances must surround the catching of a disease from exposures to heat or
cold in order to render the resulting injury a compensable injury by accident. Chop v. Swift &
Co., 118 Kan. 35, 36-37, 233 P. 800, 800-01 (1925); Hoag v. Kansas Independent Laundry Co., 113
Kan. 513, 516-17, 215 P. 295, 296-97 (1923); Ferris v. City of Eastport, 123 Me. 193, 195-96, 122 A.
410,411-12 (1923); Lerner v. Rump Bros., 241 N.Y. 153, 155, 149N.E. 334, 335 (1925). The courts
in these cases applied a requirement similar to the external cause requirement in a very limited
area. In contrast, the Slade opinion contained no language limiting application of its interpreta-
tion to a particular type of injury. In Victory Sparkler & Specialty Co. v. Francks, 147 Md. 368,
128 A. 635 (1925), the court discussed possible different interpretations of the requirement and
held that, under the Maryland statute providing compensation for accidental injuries, an unex-
pected injury alone is compensable. Id at 381-82, 128 A. at 639-40.
61. 212 N.C. 365, 193 S.E. 664 (1937).
62. Id at 366, 193 S.E. at 665.
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trolled by Slade.63 The court held that the worker's death was not the result of
an injury by accident because the evidence revealed that the injury was not
caused by an external fortuitous event.64 The actual occurrence of the heart
attack did not satisfy the new construction of the "injury by accident" require-
ment.
Slade and Neely stand together as the first holdings in North Carolina
that an injury is not "by accident" unless it is caused by a fortuitous external
event. Under the Slade rule the unexpectedness and fortuity of the occurrence
of the injury do not make it an "injury by accident." In essence Slade and
Neely overruled the liberal construction of "injury by accident" that had been
adopted in prior cases. The principal difficulty raised by the new external
cause requirement was, of course, the problem of delineating the circum-
stances under which it could be said that an injury had an external cause.65
The court responded to this problem in Moore v. Engineering & Sales
Co. 66 In that case, claimant suffered a hernia when he attempted to lift a
heavy steel pipe. Although his job involved work similar to the type he was
performing when injured, he had never lifted that particular type and weight
pipe before. In addition, claimant had attempted to lift the pipe in the absence
of the full contingent of regular workers. The court affirmed the Commis-
sion's award and held that an injury sustained under these conditions was an
"injury by accident."67 The Slade requirement of an external cause was met,
said the court, because a number of unusual conditions surrounded the em-
ployment activity that resulted in the injury.68 The court explained that the
external cause providing the necessary accident element "might be inferred"
because there was "evidence of the interruption of the routine of work, and the
63. Id Although the Slade court did not limit application of the rule to particular types of
injuries, the Slade holding could have been distinguished as applying only in cases involving
diseases resulting from exposure. The Neely court, however, applied the rule in a heart attack
case. Since Neely, the Slade rule has been applied to all types of injuries.
64. Id. at 366-67, 193 S.E. at 665.
65. In both Slade and Neely the court offered a clue that suggested how the court might
handle the external cause requirement in the future. In Slade, the Commission's decision that the
"injury by accident" requirement had been met may have been based upon a finding that the
injury occurred under "unusual conditions" of heat and exposure. 209 N.C. at 825, 184 S.E. at
845 (quoting Commission findings). Although it did not state that the presence of "unusual condi-
tions" would satisfy the external cause requirement, because the court discussed the nature of the
external circumstances surrounding the injury, the court appears to have assumed that an injury
sustained under "unusual conditions" might be compensable. The court concluded that the condi-
tions of heat and exposure in Slade were not, in fact, unusual. Id In Neely, the court also dis-
cussed the nature of surrounding conditions and determined that they were not unusual. 212 N.C.
at 366, 193 S.E. at 665. Neither court entered into an extended examination of the conditions at
the time of injury or the legal significance that the presence of unusual conditions might have. It
seems, however, that the court would not have discussed the nature of the conditions surrounding
the injuries if they might not have affected its decisions. The discussion of unusual conditions
provided a basis for development of the external cause requirement in later cases.
66. 214 N.C. 424, 199 S.E. 605 (1938).
67. Id at 430, 199 S.E. at 608.
68. Id In so holding, the court explicitly adopted the alternative argument presented by the
worker in .J Fenton v. Thorley & Co. and the approach hinted at in Slade and Neely as legitimate
methods by which to determine whether there was an "injury by accident." The approach had
been rejected in Fenton because it was held there that the unexpected result alone was compensa-
ble regardless of external conditions. See text accompanying notes 32-33 supra.
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introduction thereby of unusual conditions likely to result in unexpected con-
sequences." 69 The unusual conditions that established the occurrence of an
external accident were: 1) the absence of most regular workers and the conse-
quent necessity to lift without accustomed help; and 2) claimant's unfamiliar-
ity with the type and weight pipe lifted.70
The "unusual conditions" rule can be understood only by examining it
within the context of prior decisions. If the rule appears illogical, it must be
remembered that it arose as a liberal response to the harsh Slade rule. Injury
by accident was originally defined as an unlooked-for and untoward event,
apparently to ensure that compensation was granted when the injury was sim-
ply the unlooked-for and untoward result of job activity.71 The Slade court
applied the same definition, but held that the necessary unlooked-for or unto-
ward event had to be an external cause and could not be an internal result.72
The Moore court realized that many injuries are not caused by unexpected
external events and that the claims of many deserving workers would be de-
nied if the Slade rule went unmodified. Moore's claim presented just such a
case. The court's response was to conclude that, by definition, an injury had a
fortuitous external cause when conditions surrounding the occurrence of the
injury were sufficiently unusual.73 The presence of unusual conditions was the
required external cause. Although it is difficult to justify the assertion that the
presence of unusual conditions establishes that an injury had an external
cause,74 as a matter ofjustice, the unusual conditions rule was a commendable
modification of Slade. After Moore, a claimant unable to prove that his injury
was caused by an external event, such as a slip, could recover if sufficiently
unusual conditions surrounded his injury. A claimant not so fortunate to have
sustained his injury under unusual conditions, however, remained uncompen-
sated, even after Moore.75
The Moore opinion reveals that the court was dissatisfied with the con-
struction of "injury by accident" adopted in Slade. Promulgation of the unu-
69. 214 N.C. at 430, 199 S.E. at 608.
70. Id
71. See text accompanying notes 39-48 supra. This definition excludes injuries that are the
result of intentional or wilful acts.
72. See note 53 and accompanying text supra.
73. The following language from Moore illustrates how the court came to identify the pres-
ence of unusual conditions as being equivalent to the required external cause: "The injury sus-
tained by the plaintiff was an injury by accident in which the fortuitous and unexpected
happenings arose from the changed conditions in which the plaintiff was required to work." 214
N.C. at 430, 199 S.E. at 608. The Moore court did not insist that the injury have a direct unex-
pected cause. It was enough to say an injury had an external cause if its occurrence was sur-
rounded by unexpected happenings, unusual conditions or a change in circumstances.
74. The "unusual conditions" and "external cause" requirements measure vastly different
degrees of connection between external circumstances and the resulting injury. A good illustra-
tion of this is the injury in Moore which, though surrounded by unusual conditions, was certainly
not directly caused by the unusual conditions. The requirements are related, however, because
both measure the impact of external circumstances on the injury. The difference remains simply
one of degree. Satisfaction of either requirement is some assurance that external conditions were
abnormal, and this arguably adds some assurance that job conditions were a cause of the injury.
75. The "unusual conditions" rule is the primary one used today to determine the "injury by
accident" question. See text accompanying notes 128-38 infra.
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sual conditions rule mitigated the harsh effects of Slade and undercut its
reasoning. Yet, by examining external conditions to determine whether there
was an injury by accident, the unusual conditions rule accepted Slade's basic
premise that the sustaining of an injury alone was not an "injury by accident."
Apparently not entirely satisfied with its own mitigating rule and concerned
that its action in adopting the unusual conditions rule might be interpreted as
an acceptance of Slade's premise, the Moore court indicated that it was un-
willing to concede that Slade had foreclosed the possibility of compensation
upon proof of the unexpected injury itself. Although it was willing to rest its
decision upon an application of the unusual conditions rule,76 the Moore court
warned that it was "not prepared to say that there are no conceivable condi-
tions under which the breaking down of body tissues might not become a con-
stituent element of accident under the present statute." 77
With its 1940 decision in Smith v. Cabarrus Creamery Co. ,78 the court
took the step it had foreshadowed in Moore and effectively overruled Slade.
In Smith claimant was performing his usual job duties when he suffered a
hernia while lifting a small box out of a larger one. Compensation was
awarded. 79 Justice Seawell wrote a unanimous opinion sustaining the
award. 80 The court stated that the award could be sustained under the unu-
sual conditions rule, the unusual condition being claimant's body contact with
the big box as he lifted the smaller box.81 Rather than rely on his inconse-
quential distinction, however, the court declared that it would not "evade an
issue which is squarely laid before us, and is likely to arise again and again"82
and held that "in considering the constituent elements of 'accident' it is com-
petent to take into consideration the sudden and unexpected rupture of the
parts supporting the viscera. . . as a part of the fortuitous circumstances mak-
ing up the accident." 83
From this language it is not entirely clear whether the court intended to
hold that the occurrence of an unexpected injury would by itself satisfy the
"injury by accident" requirement or whether the court intended to modify
greatly the unusual conditions rule so that the sustaining of an injury could be
considered as a relevant unusual condition.8 4 Under either interpretation,
76. 214 N.C. at 430, 199 S.E. at 608.
77. Id This is an ambiguous statement. See note 84 and accompanying text infra.
78. 217 N.C. 468, 8 S.E.2d 231 (1940).
79. Id at 471, 8 S.E.2d at 232.
80. Id at 473, 8 S.E.2d at 234.
81. Id at 471-72, 8 S.E.2d at 233. The court also stated that there was a "reasonable infer-
ence" that the lifting was done in a constrained position and that this condition also contributed to
a finding of unusual conditions. Id at 473, 8 S.E.2d at 233. Finding sufficient unusual conditions
on these facts stretches the concept of "unusual conditions" to the extreme. Under this lenient
approach, practically any event could constitute conditions sufficiently unusual to invoke the rule.
Defendants introduced claimant's prior sworn statement in which he admitted that he was
performing his job in the usual manner and that nothing unusual occurred at the time of injury.
The court did not find claimant's admission controlling. Id at 471, 8 S.E.2d at 232.
82. Id at 471, 8 S.E.2d at 233.
83. Id at 473, 8 S.E.2d at 234.
84. The ambiguity stems from the court's statement that there are "constituent elements of
'accident'" and that the unexpected injury could be considered "as part of the fortuitous circum-
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however, Smith effectively overrules Slade.8 5 The first interpretation forth-
rightly overrules Slade because it permits an unexpected injury to constitute
an "injury by accident" whether or not the injury had an external cause. The
alternative interpretation effectively overrules Slade because it allows the sus-
taining of an injury to be considered an unusual condition. Since occurrence
of an injury is an unusual event in practically all work situations, the sus-
taining of an injury by itself would presumably provide sufficient unusual con-
ditions to satisfy the rule and entitle the claimant to compensation even if
there were no other unusual conditions.8 6 This interpretation would have
been a great modification of the unusual conditions rule because under prior
interpretations only the external work environment was considered in deter-
mining the existence of unusual conditions.8 7
The Smith court presented several arguments in support of its holding.
First, the court asserted that despite the clear holding in Slade it was free to
promulgate the liberal rule because the court had "never attempted definitely
to align itself with the minority view"88 that the sustaining of an injury could
not be considered an "element of accident." 89 Second, the court reviewed def-
initions of the word "accident" and found that they all emphasized unexpect-
edness.90 The court reasoned that the unexpectedness of the occurrence of the
injury could make an injury "by accident" and stated that there was "no
sound reason to believe that the Legislature intended to put. . . other refine-
ments" upon the requirement. 9 ' Third, the court stated that the Slade rule
was not in keeping with a liberal construction of the Act because it relieved
employers of much liability.92
stances making up the accident." Id Because this language seems to imply that an accident can
be made up of many parts, it arguably could support the position that the injury could be consid-
ered as one of many unusual conditions surrounding the accident. It seems equally plausible,
however, that the court intended that the unexpected injury would itself satisfy the requirement.
See Edwards v. Piedmont Publishing Co., 227 N.C. 184, 187-88, 193, 41 S.E.2d 592, 594, 598
(Seawell, J., concurring). The court probably realized that making a clear distinction was not of
great practical importance because the effect of either interpretation was to make the unexpected
injury itself compensable. See text accompanying notes 85-87 infra.
85. Slade was not expressly overruled. In fact, despite the incompatibility of the holdings on
similar facts, the Smith court attempted to distinguish Slade. See note 92 infra.
86. The sustaining of an injury at work is usually an unexpected and unusual event because
people generally do not intentionally persist at job activity that they expect to produce immediate
or certain injury.
87. See Moore v. Engineering & Sales Co., 214 N.C. 424, 430, 199 S.E. 605, 608 (1938), in
which the court found that the unusual conditions "arose from the changed conditions in which
the plaintiff was required to work." Id The Smith court assumed that prior decisions required
unusual conditions to be found in external circumstances. 217 N.C. at 471, 8 S.E.2d at 233.
88. 217 N.C. at 472, 8 S.E.2d at 233.
89. Id This statement is misleading because under the Slade rule the mere sustaining of an
injury clearly is not enough to satisfy the "injury by accident" requirement. Moreover, the Slade
court did intend to adopt the minority view that an external cause was required. See Slade v.
Willis Hosiery Mills, 209 N.C. 823, 825, 184 S.E. 844, 845 (1936).
90. 217 N.C. at 472, 8 S.E.2d at 233. The court referred to dictionary definitions and to a
restatement of the "injury by accident" definition first presented in Conrad v. Cook-Lewis Foun-
dry Co., 198 N.C. 723, 153 S.E. 266 (1930).
91. 217 N.C. at 472, 8 S.E.2d at 233.
92. Id
The court also attempted unpersuasively to distinguish Slade and Neely from the holding in
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In a case decided shortly after Smith, Fields v. Tompkins-Johnston Plumb-
ing Co. ,93 the court implicitly accepted the overruling of Slade, at least for
"exposure" cases. The facts in Fields were virtually identical to those in
Slade.94 Compensation was sought and awarded for death by heat exhaus-
tion.95 The worker had been caulking pipe joints with hot lead on an unusu-
ally hot day. In affirming the award,96 the court appears to have assumed that
the injury by accident requirement posed no bar to compensation. The court
ignored the injury by accident requirements laid down in Slade and Neely and
failed to explain why they were not relevant.9 7 Yet, the death in Fields, like
the one in Slade, did not result from a fortuitous external event. 98 The Fields
court's failure to insist that the Slade external cause requirement be met could
be interpreted to mean that the court was following Smith in abandoning the
Slade rule altogether, or it could be given a more limited but still significant
meaning as a decision not to impose the external cause requirement in "expo-
sure" cases.99
With the 1947 decision in Edwards v. Piedmont Publishing Co. ,100 how-
ever, the court once again began to retreat from its liberal interpretation of the
injury by accident requirement. Edwards has been cited as the case that
finally established that an unexpected injury alone cannot be considered either
Smith. Id The court stated that the Slade rule applied in the rare situation when both the exter-
nal conditions and the sustaining of the injury could be considered usual or probable conse-
quences of the work. On the other hand, the court said, the Smith holding applied to cases in
which the sustaining of the injury was an unusual and unexpected consequence of the work. This
distinction is unconvincing because the facts of the cases do not support it. The injury in Smith
was no more or less a probable consequence of the work than the injuries in Slade and Neely.
Although the injuries in Slade and Neely could not be said to be probable consequences of the
work, the Slade rule nevertheless was applied to deny compensation.
93. 224 N.C. 841, 32 S.E.2d 623 (1945). The opinion was written by Chief Justice Stacy, the
author of Slade.
The Fields opinion appears to be exclusively concerned with the issue whether the injury
arose out of the work. The court discussed the special causation problems associated with injuries
that are sustained in employment that subjects workers to particular hazards from the elements.
The court adopted a causation test under which compensation was proper if employment sub-
jected the worker to greater risk of exposure than that to which he would otherwise be exposed.
Id at 843, 32 S.E.2d at 624.
94. In both cases the worker died after exposure to extreme working conditions. The deaths
did not result from obvious external causes and in both cases regular work was performed in the
customary manner.
95. 224 N.C. at 842, 32 S.E.2d at 624.
96. Id at 843, 32 S.E.2d at 624.
97. The court mentioned Slade and Neely only for the purpose of stating that language in
those cases was not relevant to the question at issue in Fie/ds-whether the injury arose out of the
worker's employment. Id The question whether there was an external cause or unusual condi-
tions was simply not addressed.
98. Of course, the hot working conditions constituted an external cause, but similar working
conditions were found in Slade not to be the type of external cause that satisfied the injury by
accident requirement. The death in Fields, therefore, lacked an external cause as defined in Slade.
99. It is difficult to determine the court's intent because it simply did not address the injury
by accident question. Because Fields was an "exposure" case, the position that assigns the more
limited meaning to the case can be maintained with more certainty.
There have been no "exposure" cases in North Carolina since Fields. It is thus arguable that
Fields is current authority for the proposition that the injury by accident requirement does not
apply in "exposure" cases.
100. 277 N.C. 184, 41 S.E.2d 592 (1947).
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an injury by accident or an unusual condition. 10' It is arguable, however, that
the court did not go quite so far. Claimants in Edwards, a pressman, ruptured
a disc while twisting to hand a pressplate to another worker. Making this mo-
tion was part of claimant's usual job, and there was no evidence that he had
slipped. Compensation was awarded,' 02 and the court affirmed upon a finding
of unusual conditions.' 03 In discussing compensability the court did not even
consider whether the sustaining of the injury might itself satisfy the injury by
accident requirement. Such a holding was certainly a possibility after Smith
and Fields. Although its language is unclear, the court arguably found two
unusual conditions: 1) the handing of the plate in a twisted position, 104 and 2)
the sudden occurrence of the internal injury itself.'0 5 It is thus possible that
the unexpected injury itself was a consideration in the court's analysis of
whether unusual conditions did exist. Such an interpretation would be consis-
tent with one of the possible interpretations of the ambiguous Smith hold-
ing.' 06
In a lengthy and eloquent concurrence,' 07 Justice Seawell protested that
the Edwards court had overruled Smith without so stating and without expla-
nation.'08 He stated that the court's approach showed it had adopted the mi-
nority position that an unexpected injury could be neither an injury by
accident nor an unusual condition.' 09 Seawell listed numerous reasons why
adoption of the minority view was poor public policy 10 and he concluded that
sustaining an unexpected injury alone satisfied "every essential definitional
101. Hensley v. Farmers Fed'n Coop., 246 N.C. 274, 279, 98 S.E.2d 289, 293 (1957).
102. 227 N.C. at 185, 41 S.E.2d at 592.
103. Id at 187,41 S.E.2d at 594. In a concurring opinion Justice Seawell stated that the injury
was not sustained under unusual conditions. He asserted that the plate was handled in a usual
manner and that the evidence was "clear of any pretense that the work was not being done in the
...ordinary way." Id at 188, 41 S.E.2d at 594 (Seawell, J., concurring). Justice Seawell's con-
clusion on the unusual conditions issue was perhaps somewhat overstated because he argued
further that, despite the lack of unusual conditions, compensation was proper upon the occurrence
of the unexpected injury alone. See text accompanying notes 107-11 infra.
104. Id at 186-87, 41 S.E.2d at 594.
105. id at 187, 41 S.E.2d at 594. The court stated that "evidence of the sudden and unex-
pected displacement of the plaintiffs intervertebral disc under the strain of lifting and turning as
described" lent support to the conclusion that the injury was an injury by accident. .d This
language is ambiguous because it is not clear whether it was the unexpected injury itself or injury
under stressful unusual conditions that lent support to the conclusion. If it was the latter, then the
occurrence of the injury was not a consideration in the court's finding of unusual conditions.
106. See text accompanying notes 86-87 supra.
107. Justice Seawell concurred in result but dissented from the principle on which the result
was reached. His view was that compensation was proper because of the unexpected injury alone.
108. 227 N.C. at 188, 41 S.E.2d at 595 (Seawell, J., concurring). Justice Seawell stated, "I do
not question the right of the Court to overrule or disregard Smith v. Creamery Co.,. .. without
assigning any reason for it. It cannot be distinguished." 1d
109. Id at 187, 41 S.E.2d at 594.
110. The following arguments against adoption of the minority view were presented: 1) it was
contrary to the original English construction; 2) it was contrary to the majority construction in the
United States; 3) it was contrary to the early North Carolina construction; 4) it was impossible to
apply; 5) it offended the basic humanitarian purpose of the Act; 6) it deprived workers of benefits
fairly bargained for in enactment of the system; 7) it violated the rule of liberal construction; and
8) it was not necessary if the rationale behind adoption of the view was the desire to ensure that
only job-related injuries were compensated. Id at 189-93, 41 S.E.2d at 595-98 (Seawell, J., con-
curring).
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requirement of 'injury by accident' within the meaning of the Compensation
law."' 11
Justice Seawell's fear that Edwards would fortify the Slade rule and the
restricted version of the unusual conditions rule was well-founded. In post-
Edwards cases over the next ten years the court required either an external
cause or external unusual conditions."12 Despite the ambiguous language in
both Smith and Edwards indicating that the injury itself might be an unusual
condition, only external conditions, and not the occurrence of the injury itself,
were considered in the unusual conditions analyses of subsequent cases. This
approach was simply accepted as proper, and the court did not attempt to
justify it in light of Smith or contrary policy considerations. " 3
It was not until 1957, in Hensley v. Farmers Federation Cooperative," 4
that the court reviewed and attempted to reconcile its prior injury by accident
cases. The Hensley court entrenched the Slade rule and the restricted version
of the unusual conditions rule as the definitive construction of "injury by acci-
dent" in North Carolina. In Hensley, claimant had suffered a hernia when he
twisted to lift a basket of chickens. Lifting chickens with a twisting motion
was part of claimant's usual job, and nothing unusual surrounded the work at
the-time of injury. Compensation was awarded, presumably because the twist
was the external unusual condition." 15
In a lengthy opinion the court reversed the award, determining that the
injury was not an injury by accident because it was not the result of an exter-
nal cause nor were there any unusual conditions surrounding its occur-
rence. 11 6 The court reviewed its previous injury by accident cases" t7 and
concluded that before Smith the injury by accident requirement was not met
absent an external cause or external unusual conditions." 18 The Hensley court
then examined Smith and concluded that, despite its clear holding, the Smith
court had not overruled the previous decisions. 119 This conclusion was "ap-
111. Id at 188, 41 S.E.2d at 594-95 (Seawell, J., concurring).
112. See, e.g., Lewter v. Abercrombie Enterprises, Inc., 240 N.C. 399, 82 S.E.2d 410 (1954);
Rice v. Thomasville Chair Co., 238 N.C. 121,76 S.E.2d 311 (1953); West v. N.C. Dept. of Conser-
vation & Dev., 229 N.C. 232,49 S.E.2d 398 (1948); Gabriel v. Town of Newton, 227 N.C. 314, 42
S.E.2d 96 (1947).
113. In Lewter v. Abercrombie Enterprises, Inc., 240 N.C. 399, 404, 82 S.E.2d 410, 415 (1954),
the court did acknowledge that its interpretation was in the minority.
114. 246 N.C. 274, 98 S.E.2d 289 (1957).
115. Id at 275-76, 98 S.E.2d at 290.
116. Id at 278-81, 98 S.E.2d at 292-94.
117. The court discussed Conrad, Slade, Neely, Moore, Smith and Edwards.
118. 246 N.C. at 278, 98 S.E.2d at 292. The court restated the liberal definition of "injury by
accident" adopted in Conrad, but failed to discuss the court's early liberal interpretation of the
requirement.
119. Id at 279-80, 98 S.E.2d at 293. The court stated that the Smith court used
language which lends support to the argument that the Court intended to adopt a new
rule and hold the injury and accident were equivalent.. . . [Nevertheless, tlhat the
Court did not intend to abandon the rule announced in previous decisions that compen-
sation could not be awarded unless the injury was produced by an accident seems appar-
ent.
Id at 279, 98 S.E.2d at 293.
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parent"'120 for two reasons. First, Buchanan v. State Highway & Public Works
Commission,12 1 decided shortly before Smith, and Edwards,'22 decided seven
years after Smith, both applied the pre-Smith rule. Second, said the court, the
contested language in Smith was dictum 123 because on its facts Smith fit
within the traditional unusual conditions exception.' 24 These reasons are un-
persuasive in light of the clear holding in Smith. 25 The Hensley court should
have acknowledged that it was merely formalizing the effect of Edwards126 by
expressly overturning Smith and adopting the Slade and restricted unusual
conditions rules. 127
Since Hensley the court has consistently employed the Slade and unusual
conditions rules to determine whether there was an injury by accident. This
issue arises regularly and, when there is no external cause, the court has devel-
oped a standardized shorthand method for determining whether unusual con-
ditions exist. An injury is "by accident" if surrounding external circumstances
cause an "interruption of the work routine and the introduction thereby of
unusual conditions likely to result in unexpected consequences."' 28 An injury
is not "by accident" if the claimant was "merely carrying on the usual and
customary duties in the usual way."'129 Such factors as unusual twists,' 30 over-
exertion,' 3 ' working in restricted positions, 132 working shorthanded, 33 and
120. Id at 279, 98 S.E.2d at 293.
121. 217 N.C. 173, 7 S.E.2d 382 (1940). The facts in Buchanan were unusual. Claimant had
"turned sick and blind" as he was performing his usual job. Id at 174, 7 S.E.2d at 382. The court
held that claimant had not met any of the three requirements of the compensation formula ("in-
jury by accident," "arising out of," or "in the course of") and denied recovery. Id at 175, 7
S.E.2d at 383. Although the court cited Slade and Neely and distinguished Moore to support its
conclusion, it did not discuss the injury by accident question.
Since Buchanan was decided before Smith it is of little value in determining the intentions of
the Smith court. Buchanan's relevance is further limited because the court did not discuss the
injury by accident issue and because of its unusual facts.
122. 227 N.C. 184, 41 S.E.2d 592 (1947). See text accompanying notes 100-06 supra.
123. 246 N.C. at 280, 98 S.E.2d at 294.
124. Id. at 279, 98 S.E.2d at 293. The court stated that "[flactually the case came within the
rule announced by the Court in Moore v. Sales Co. and hence outside of the rule laid down in the
Slade and Neely cases. This was frankly recognized by Justice Seawell, who wrote the opinion."
Id
125. The Smith court did state that its award could have been sustained under the unusual
conditions rule. The court, however, expressly stated that it was adopting a new liberal rule and
that it was not applying the unusual conditions exception. See text accompanying notes 78-83
supra.
126. See text accompanying notes 107-I1 supra.
127. The court acknowledged that it was adopting the minority position, which it attempted to
justify on two grounds: 1) the restrictive interpretation had been so consistently given to the stat-
ute that the court had no right to change it; and 2) the negative statutory definition of the word
"accident," (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-52 (1979)), as including only unusual events supported the
minority view. 246 N.C. at 280-81, 98 S.E.2d at 294. For further discussion of the first justifica-
tion, see text accompanying notes 149-59 infra. For the text of the statutory definition, see note 38
supra. The statutory definition does not support the minority interpretation because the required
unusual event could be interpreted as either an unexpected cause or an unexpected result.
128. Harding v. Thomas & Howard Co., 256 N.C. 427, 429, 124 S.E.2d 109, 111 (1962).
129. Id
130. See, e.g., Keller v. Electric Wiring Co., 259 N.C. 222, 130 S.E.2d 342 (1963); Searcy v.
Branson, 253 N.C. 64, 116 S.E.2d 175 (1960); Edwards v. Piedmont Publishing Co., 227 N.C. 184,
41 S.E.2d 592 (1947).
131. See, e.g., Davis v. Summitt, 259 N.C. 57, 129 S.E.2d 588 (1963); Faires v. McDevitt & St.
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working at a new task 134 have been found to constitute unusual conditions.
Working in hot weather, 135 working in a hurry 136 and working at a slightly
unusual task 137 may contribute to a finding of unusual conditions, but gener-
ally will not support that finding by themselves. Often the court simply makes
the conclusory finding that no unusual conditions existed. 13 8
The unusual conditions rule thus creates the need to make close factual
distinctions and as a result the decisions are difficult to reconcile. Unusual
conditions have been found to exist in situations that appear to be quite typical
for the work environment and have found lacking in other cases that present
similar fact situations. 139 This inconsistency raises the basic question whether
the court's disposition of unusual condition cases truly is based upon findings
of particular unusual conditions like those mentioned above. Although deci-
sions purport to rely on the process of ascertaining unusual conditions, opin-
ions are likely influenced to some extent by underlying judgments about the
essential work-relatedness of the injury 140 and the situation of the parties
Co., 251 N.C. 194, 110 S.E.2d 898 (1959); Gabriel v. Town of Newton, 227 N.C. 314, 42 S.E.2d 96
(1947).
132. See, e.g., Faires v. McDevitt & St. Co., 251 N.C. 194, 110 S.E.2d 898 (1959); Dunton v.
Daniel Constr. Co., 19 N.C. App. 51, 198 S.E.2d 8 (1973); Bigelow v. Tire Sales Co., 12 N.C. App.
220, 182 S.E.2d 856 (1971).
133. See, eg., Davis v. Summit, 259 N.C. 57, 129 S.E.2d 588 (1963); Faires v. McDevitt & St.
Co., 251 N.C. 194, 110 S.E.2d 898 (1959); Moore v. Engineering & Sales Co., 214 N.C. 424, 199
S.E. 605 (1938).
134. See, e.g., Faires v. McDevitt & St. Co., 251 N.C. 194, 110 S.E.2d 898 (1959); Key v.
Wagner Woodcraft, Inc., 33 N.C. App. 310, 235 S.E.2d 254 (1977).
135. See, e.g., West v. N.C. Dept. of Conservation & Dev., 229 N.C. 232, 49 S.E.2d 398 (1948)
(compensation denied).
136. See, e.g., Southards v. Byrd Motor Lines, Inc., 11 N.C. App. 583, 181 S.E.2d 811 (1971)
(compensation denied).
137. See, eg., Ferrell v. Montgomery & Aldridge Sales Co., 262 N.C. 76, 136 S.E.2d 227
(1964) (compensation denied); Bellamy v. Morace Stevedoring Co., 258 N.C. 327, 128 S.E.2d 395
(1962) (compensation denied); Moore v. Engineering & Sales Co., 214 N.C. 424, 199 S.E. 605
(1938) (compensation awarded).
138. See, e.g., Rhinehart v. Roberts Super Market, Inc., 271 N.C. 586, 157 S.E.2d 1 (1967);
Harding v. Thomas & Howard Co., 256 N.C. 427, 124 S.E.2d 109 (1962); Holt v. Cannon Mills
Co., 249 N.C. 215, 105 S.E.2d 614 (1958).
139. See text accompanying notes 92-97 infra.
140. The presence of a pre-existing medical condition and other factors may raise a serious
question whether work was a real cause of the injury. In the following cases the possibility that
the injury was not work related may have influenced the finding of a lack of unusual conditions
and, thus, an injury by accident: Jackson v. N.C. State Highway Comm'n, 272 N.C. 697, 158
S.E.2d 865 (1968) (prior heart attack); Rhinehart v. Roberts Super Market, Inc., 271 N.C. 586, 157
S.E.2d 1 (1967) (congenital condition); Andrews v. County of Pitt, 269 N.C. 577, 153 S.E.2d 67
(1967) (heart condition); Ferrell v. Montgomery & Aldridge Sales Co., 262 N.C. 76, 136 S.E.2d
227 (1964) (prior heart condition); Bellamy v. Morace Stevedoring Co., 258 N.C. 327, 128 S.E.2d
395 (1962) (prior arteriosclorosis); Lewter v. Abercrombie Enterprises, Inc., 240 N.C. 399,-82
S.E.2d 410 (1954) (high blood pressure); West v. N.C. Dept. of Conservation & Dev., 229 N.C.
232,.49 S.E.2d 398 (1948) (prior heart condition).
But see the following cases in which sufficient unusual conditions to create an injury by acci-
dent were found despite the presence of pre-existing medical conditions: Faires v. McDevitt & St.
Co., 251 N.C. 194, 110 S.E.2d 898 (1959) (prior hernia); McMahan v. Hickey's Supermarket, 24
N.C. App. 113, 210 S.E.2d 214 (1974) (prior hernia); Bigelow v. Tire Sales Co., 12 N.C. App. 220,
182 S.E.2d 856 (1971) (disc deterioration); Soles v. Stephens Farm Equip. Co., 8 N.C. App. 658,
175 S.E.2d 339 (1970) (prior disc problems).
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before the court.14' It is extremely difficult, however, to determine how much
weight is given to these considerations because most opinions do not contain
the detailed facts from which such determinations could be made and the
court does not express when or how much these underlying considerations
play a part in its decisions.
Since Hensley, judicial decisions denying awards when the injury by acci-
dent question was seriously at issue have outnumbered decisions granting
awards by almost two to one. 142 Although only one Commission decision de-
nying an award on the basis of lack of unusual conditions has been re-
versed, 143 the courts have frequently overturned decisions granting awards
141. In Bigelow v. Tires Sales Co., 12 N.C. App. 220, 182 S.E.2d 856 (1971), the court found
unusual conditions in a close case. The court mentioned that claimant had worked 20 years for
the employer and that he had a third grade education.
142. Awards have been denied because of lack of unusual conditions in the following cases:
Jackson v. N.C. State Highway Comm'n, 272 N.C. 697, 158 S.E.2d 865 (1968); Rhinehart v. Rob-
erts Super Market, Inc., 271 N.C. 586, 157 S.E.2d 1 (1967); Andrews v. County of Pitt, 269 N.C.
577, 153 S.E.2d 67 (1967); Lawrence v. Hatch Mill, 265 N.C. 329, 144 S.E.2d 3 (1965); Ferrell v.
Montgomery & Aldridge Sales Co., 262 N.C. 76, 136 S.E.2d 227 (1964); O'Mary v. Land Clearing
Corp., 261 N.C. 508, 135 S.E.2d 193 (1964); Byrd v. Farmers Fed'n Coop., 260 N.C. 215, 132
S.E.2d 348 (1963); Bellamy v. Morace Stevedoring Co., 258 N.C. 327, 128 S.E.2d 395 (1962);
Harding v. Thomas & Howard Co., 256 N.C. 427, 124 S.E.2d 109 (1962); Turner v. Burke Hosiery
Mill, 251 N.C. 325, 111 S.E.2d 185 (1959); Holt v. Cannon Mills Co., 249 N.C. 215, 105 S.E.2d 614
(1958); Artis v. North Carolina Baptist Hosps., Inc., 44 N.C. App. 64, 259 S.E.2d 784 (1979);
Curtis v. Carolina Mechanical Systems, Inc., 36 N.C. App. 621, 244 S.E.2d 690 (1978); Smith v.
Burlington Indus., 35 N.C. App. 105, 239 S.E.2d 845 (1978); Pulley v. Migrant & Seasonal
Farmworkers Ass'n, 30 N.C. App. 94, 226 S.E.2d 227 (1976); Hewett v. Constructor's Supply Co.,
29 N.C. App. 395, 224 S.E.2d 297, cert. denied, 290 N.C. 550, 226 S.E.2d 510 (1976); Beamon v.
Stop & Shop Grocery, 27 N.C. App. 553, 219 S.E.2d 508 (1975); Vassor v. Albemarle Paper Co.,
18 N.C. App. 570, 197 S.E.2d 260 (1973); Russell v. Pharr Yarns, Inc., 18 N.C. App. 249, 196
S.E.2d 571 (1973); Garmon v. Tridair Indus., 14 N.C. App. 574, 188 S.E.2d 523 (1972); Southards
v. Byrd Motor Lines, Inc., 11 N.C. App. 583, 181 S.E.2dI 1 (1971); Gray v. Durham Transfer &
Storage, Inc., 10 N.C. App. 668, 179 S.E.2d 883 (1971).
Awards based upon a finding of unusual conditions have been granted in the following cases:
Keller v. Electric Wiring Co., 259 N.C. 222, 130 S.E.2d 342 (1963); Davis v. Summitt, 259 N.C. 57,
129 S.E.2d 588 (1963); Searcy v. Branson, 253 N.C. 64, 116 S.E.2d 175 (1960); Faires v. McDevitt
& St. Co., 251 N.C. 194, 110 S.E.2d 898 (1959); King v. Forsyth County, 45 N.C. App. 467, 263
S.E.2d 283 (1980); Searcey v. Alexander Constr. Co., 35 N.C. App. 78, 239 S.E.2d 847, cert. denied,
294 N.C. 736, 244 S.E.2d 154 (1978); Key v. Wagner Woodcraft, Inc., 33 N.C. App. 310, 235
S.E.2d 254 (1977); McMahan v. Hickey's Supermarket, 24 N.C. App. 113, 210 S.E.2d 214 (1974);
Dunton v. Daniel Constr. Co., 19 N.C. App. 51, 198 S.E.2d 8 (1973); Bigelow v. Tire Sales Co., 12
N.C. App. 220, 182 S.E.2d 856 (1971); Soles v. Stephens Farm Equip. Co., 8 N.C. App. 658, 175
S.E.2d 339 (1970). Unusual conditions were found, but an award was denied on other grounds in
Lutes v. Export Leaf Tobacco Co., 19 N.C. App. 380, 198 S.E.2d 746 (1973).
143. King v.-Forsyth County, 45 N.C. App. 467, 263 S.E.2d 283 (1980). The King decision is
very interesting because it may be an indication that the court is moving toward reform of the
traditional injury by accident rule. In King claimant, a deputy sheriff, suffered a heart attack
immediately after he engaged in an "extremely vigorous" foot chase of a suspect. Id at 470, 263
S.E.2d at 285. There was medical testimony that claimant's exertion caused the injury. Although
the Commission denied an award on the basis of lack of unusual conditions, the court of appeals
reversed. Id at 471, 263 S.E.2d at 285. The court stated that claimant's pursuit of the suspect
amounted to "overexertion," and that the existence of the overexertion was sufficient to make the
injury compensable. Id If the court had stopped there, its holding and approach would have fit
comfortably within the traditional unusual conditions framework, as overexertion had long been
recognized as an unusual condition. See note 131 and accompanying text supra. In its holding,
however, the court specifically noted that, when an injury is caused by overexertion, it is compen-
sable whether or not the nature of the activity engaged in was usual or unusual. 45 N.C. App. at
471, 263 S.E.2d at 285. Although the holding does not overrule any prior decisions, both the
language of the holding de-emphasizing the nature of the activity and the result itself indicate that
the court may be taking a more liberal approach to the injury by accident issue.
[Vol. 59
INJUR Y BY ACCIDENT
after determining that nothing unusual surrounded the injury. 44 The
supreme court, however, has acknowledged complaints about its interpretation
and has noted that North Carolina is in the minority in its construction of the
injury by accident requirement. 45 Furthermore, it has invited the General
Assembly to amend the statute.' 46 In one post-Hensley case the court even
stated that, while compensation would be awarded under any rule if a laborer
was injured while dropping a rock, the view that compensation should be de-
nied if a laborer was injured while lifting and heaving a rock did "not com-
mend itself as either very sound reasoning or very good law.' 147 Such
comments are rare, however, and in most cases the court has simply stated and
applied the rule, usually to the detriment of the claimant.
III. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR NORTH CAROLINA'S INJURY
BY ACCIDENT INTERPRETATION
The North Carolina Supreme Court has advanced only two justifications,
one expressly and one by implication, for its construction of the "injury by
accident" requirement. The court's only express justification for its position
has been that the court does not have the power to change its consistently
conservative interpretation of the statute. The implied justification is rooted in
the court's fear that improper application of the Workers' Compensation Act
could result in limitless employer liability. The court repeatedly has asserted
that only work-related injuries are compensable and that the system is not a
general accident and health insurance program. 148 Although the court has
never expressly justified its interpretation in this manner, its construction ar-
guably could be justified because it serves as a necessary additional require-
ment of causal connection between employment and injury that helps ensure
that only work-related injuries are compensated.
On several occasions the court has stated that it will not change its con-
144. Rhinehart v. Roberts Super Market, Inc., 271 N.C. 586, 157 S.E.2d 1 (1967); Lawrence v.
Hatch Mills, 265 N.C. 329, 144 S.E.2d 3 (1965); Ferrell v. Montgomery & Aldridge Sales Co., 262
N.C. 76, 136 S.E.2d 227 (1964); Bellamy v. Morace Stevedoring Co., 258 N.C. 327, 128 S.E.2d 395
(1962); Harding v. Thomas & Howard Co., 256 N.C. 427, 124 S.E.2d 109 (1962); Hensley v. Farm-
ers Fed'n Coop., 246 N.C. 274, 98 S.E.2d 289 (1957); Lewter v. Abercrombie Enterprises, Inc., 240
N.C. 399, 82 S.E.2d 410 (1954); Pulley v. Migrant & Seasonal Farmworkers Ass'n, 30 N.C. App.
94, 226 S.E.2d 227 (1976).
145. O'Mary v. Land Clearing Corp., 261 N.C. 508, 510-11, 135 S.E.2d 193, 195 (1964); Har-
ding v. Thomas & Howard Co., 256 N.C. 427,429, 124 S.E.2d 109, 111 (1962); Hensley v. Farmers
Fed'n Coop., 246 N.C. 274, 280, 98 S.E.2d 289, 293 (1957).
146. O'Mary v. Land Clearing Corp., 261 N.C. 508, 511, 135 S.E.2d 193, 195 (1964); Harding
v. Thomas & Howard Co., 256 N.C. 427, 429, 124 S.E.2d 109, 111 (1962); Holt v. Cannon Mills,
249 N.C. 215, 216, 105 S.E.2d 614, 615 (1958); Hensley v. Farmers Fed'n Coop., 246 N.C. 274, 281,
98 S.E.2d 289, 294 (1957).
147. Keller v. Electric Wiring Co., 259 N.C. 222, 225, 130 S.E.2d 342, 344 (1963).
148. Bryan v. First Free Will Baptist Church, 267 N.C. 111, 115, 147 S.E.2d 633, 635 (1966);
Duncan v. City of Charlotte, 234 N.C. 86, 90-91, 66 S.E.2d 22, 25 (1951); Vause v. Vause Farm
Equip. Co., 233 N.C. 88, 92, 63 S.E.2d 173, 176 (1951). In Duncan the court said that the "rule of
causal relation is the very sheet anchor of the Workmen's Compensation Act. It has kept the Act
within the limits of its intended scope--that of providing compensation benefits for industrial
injuries, rather than branching out into the field of general health insurance benefits." 234 N.C. at
91, 66 S.E.2d at 25 (1951).
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struction of the statute because it feels bound by its current interpretation. 149
This justification for the current construction was first advanced in Hensley.
In that case the court stated that the conservative Slade interpretation had
been "so consistently given to the statute" that it had acquired the status of a
written statute. 150 The court protested that, although its interpretation was in
the minority,' 5 ' the court had "no right to change or ignore it."' 152 Thus, the
court stated, legislative action would be required to effect a change in the in-
terpretation. 153
There are two effective criticisms of this justification for continuing the
current interpretation. First, as illustrated in Section II above, the court's pre-
Hensley interpretation of the statutory requirement was anything but consis-
tent. Prior to Hensley a liberal construction, holding the unexpected injury
itself compensable, was the rule for as many years as the current conservative
one had been. 154 The liberal Smith holding was not formally overturned until
Hensley, the very case that purported to find a consistent, long-standing con-
servative interpretation. 155 There has been a consistent construction since
Hensley, but the authority for that construction has been Hensley itself. A
justification that stands on such bootstrapping is unpersuasive. 156 Second,
when changing circumstances have warranted it, the supreme court has over-
ruled outmoded holdings, 157 including long-standing interpretations of stat-
149. Harding v. Thomas & Howard Co., 256 N.C. 427,429, 124 S.E.2d 109, 111 (1962); Holt v.
Cannon Mills, 249 N.C. 215, 216, 105 S.E.2d 614, 615 (1958).
150. 246 N.C. 274, 281, 98 S.E.2d 289, 294 (1957).
151. Id at 280, 98 S.E.2d at 293.
152. Id at 281, 98 S.E.2d at 294.
153. Id See also Harding v. Thomas & Howard Co., 256 N.C. 427, 429, 124 S.E.2d 109, 111
(1962); Holt v. Cannon Mills, 249 N.C. 215, 216, 105 S.E.2d 614, 615 (1958).
154. The court followed a liberal interpretation for a total of 14 years, consisting of the seven
years between passage of the Act in 1929 and the decision in Slade in 1936 and the seven years
between the Smith decision in 1940 and that of Edwards in 1947. There was also a total of 14
conservative years consisting of the four years between the Slade decision in 1936 and the Smith
opinion in 1940 and the 10 years between the court's holding in Edwards in 1947 and its decision
in Hensley in 1957.
155. Although Smith was not formally overturned until Hensley, in the years after Edwards
and before Hensley, the court effectively overruled Smith by simply ignoring its holding.
156. The justification also violates the rule that stare decisis does not apply when there are
conflicting decisions. 21 C.J.S. Courts § 192 (1940). This rule has been recognized in North Caro-
lina. See State v. Mobley, 240 N.C. 476, 487, 83 S.E.2d 100, 108 (1954); Patterson v. McCormick,
177 N.C. 448, 457, 99 S.E. 401, 405 (1919).
157. See, e.g., Bulova Watch Co. v. Brand Distribs., 285 N.C. 467, 481, 206 S.E.2d 141, 151
(1974) (overruling Lilly & Co. v. Saunders, 216 N.C. 163, 4 S.E.2d 528 (1930), on the constitution-
ality of Fair Trade Act); Rabon v. Rowan Memorial Hosp., Inc., 269 N.C. 1, 21, 152 S.E.2d 485,
499 (1967) (overruling Williams v. Randolph Hosp. Inc., 237 N.C. 387, 75 S.E.2d 303 (1953), and
Williams v. Union County Hosp. Ass'n, 234 N.C. 536, 67 S.E.2d 662 (1951), on the tort immunity
of charitable hospitals); State v. Mobley, 240 N.C. 476, 486, 83 S.E.2d 100, 107 (1954) (overruling
State v. Freeman, 86 N.C. 683 (1882), on the issue of arrest without warrant when no breach of
peace). TheRabon court recognized that in previous decisions it had been declared that changing
the rule was properly a matter solely for the legislature but, nevertheless, changed the rule. 269
N.C. 1, 13-14, 152 S.E.2d 485, 493-94.
Overruling of the injury by accident requirement would not disrupt vested property rights, a
concern that supports the policy of stare decisis. The court has stated that "a decision of this
Court, subsequently concluded to have been erroneous, may properly be overruled when such
action will not disturb property rights previously vested in reliance upon the earlier decision."
Bulova Watch Co. v. Brand Distribs., 285 N.C. at 473, 206 S.E.2d at 145.
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utes.' 58 In discussing situations in which application of stare decisis is not
appropriate, Justice Ervin stated that it should "not be applied in any event to
preserve and perpetuate error and grievious wrong. . . 'There is no virtue in
sinning against light or in persisting in palpable error, for nothing is settled
until it is settled right.' "159 The stare decisis objection should therefore not be
an impassable obstacle to a court convinced that the current injury by accident
interpretation is erroneous.
The second, implied justification supporting the court's interpretation of
the injury by accident requirement-that the interpretation serves as an extra
causal requirement necessary to keep liability within proper bounds-is at
least superficially more persuasive. Workers' compensation is only intended
to provide compensation for injuries that are causally related to the work. 160
Determining the cause of some injuries, however, especially heart, hernia, and
back injuries that may have resulted at least in part from degenerative
processes, can be very difficult.' 6' Often medical knowledge simply can not
tell how much any one of many possible causes contributed to an injury. In
158. See, e.g., State v. Blackmon, 260 N.C. 352, 132 S.E.2d 880 (1963) (overruling State v.
Swindell, 189 N.C. 151, 126 S.E. 417 (1925) and State v. Cain, 209 N.C. 275, 183 S.E. 300 (1936),
on interpretation of punishment statute).
159. State v. Ballance, 229 N.C. 764, 767, 51 S.E.2d 731, 737 (1949) (quoting Spitzer & Co. v.
Commissioners of Franklin County, 188 N.C. 30, 123 S.E. 636 (1924)).
160. Vause v. Vause Farm Equip. Co., 233 N.C. 88, 92, 63 S.E.2d 173, 176 (1951).
161. See E. CHEIT, supra note 19, at 324-33. See also M. BERKOWITZ, WORKMEN'S COMPEN-
SATION 248-60 (1960); Cohen & Klein, A Proposed Solution to the Legal Problems of Workmen's
Compensation Heart Cases, in I SUPPLEMENTAL STUDIES FOR THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON-
STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS 199 (M. Berkowitz ed. 1973); Mitchell, Some Medical
Issues in Workmen's Compensation, in 2 SUPPLEMENTAL STUDIES FOR THE NATIONAL COMMIS-
SION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS 355 (M. Berkowitz ed. 1973).
Heart injuries pose the most serious problem because of the prevalence of heart disease in
society and because there is widespread disagreement in the medical community regarding the
interrelation between them and job effort. See Cohen & Klein, supra. Although use of the term
"heart attack" is, from a medical standpoint, imprecise, it is used in the case law. Most heart
attacks are medically known as myocardial infarcations. They occur when blood vessels become
so blocked that the blood flow is insufficient to meet the demands of the heart. See McLaughlin,
The Compensability of Heart Injuries Under the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act, 21 U.
PrrT. L. REy. 445, 446-54 (1960); Mitchell, supra. The extent of disagreement about the medical
cause of heart injuries was illustrated in one survey of five cardiologists. The doctors reviewed 319
compensation cases in an attempt to answer questions pertaining to causation. Complete agree-
ment was reached in only 47 cases. In 90 cases four doctors agreed. In 48 cases only two physi-
cians agreed, and the panel was unable to arrive at a majority opinion. Furthermore, when the
cases were reviewed later by the doctors without knowing the cases had been seen previously, in
30% of the opinions the physicians reversed themselves. See Goshkin, LegislativeAction, The Only
Reasonable Solution to the Problems of Workmen's Compensation Heart Cases, 5 THE FORUM 329,
335 n.17 (1969-70) (citing Heart Claims Under the California Workmen's Compensation Act, 13
CIRCULATION 448 (1956)). While the great preponderance of medical thought does agree that
some form of heart disease must pre-exist a heart injury, see IB LARSON, supra note 23, § 38.83, at
7-247, medical science readily admits that it cannot, with any degree of certainty, determine the
initiating cause of a heart attack. See Goshkin, supra, at 335. The results of several studies into
the relationship between heart attacks and unusual physical exertion are inclusive. See Mitchell,
supra.
Although the medical cause of the most common form of occupational hernia, iguinal hernia,
is understood, the relationship of hernia occurrence to job activity is less well known. Id at 356.
A hernia occurs when the contents of the abdomen protrude from their normal position through a
weakness in the lower abdominal wall. The question whether occupational stress caused a partic-
ular protrusion is a matter of judgment about which physicians may disagree. While job activity
can cause a hernia, significant medical opinion does hold to the view that ordinary muscular effort
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this vacuum the courts have shown suspicion toward injuries that might have
both employment and nonemployment causes. They have demonstrated a
proper reluctance to award compensation for injuries that may be connected
with work to the extent that they occur within the time and space limits of
employment, but may be more truly caused by degenerative processes inherent
in the wear and tear of life.' 62 Although the statutory formula contains two
explicit causation tests, the "arising out of" test163 and the "in the course of"
test,' 64 it was surely fear that these two traditional tests could not screen out
non-job-related claims that motivated the court to press the injury by accident
component into service as a third causation test. 165
This third causation requirement that tests for an external cause or unu-
sual conditions is, unfortunately, unduly harsh and arbitrary.' 66 Underlying
the requirement is the assumption that the presence of some type of unusual
circumstances in the work environment-either an external cause or unusual
conditions-is a reliable indication of whether the injury was causally related
to the work. The external cause requirement arguably helps ensure work-re-
latedness because, if there was such a cause, it is possible that it, and not natu-
ral degeneration, was the cause of the injury. The unusual conditions
requirement also arguably adds assurance of work relatedness in the same
way, although less reliably, because the presence of such conditions indicates
that there was some irregular element in the work environment that could
have accounted for the injury. The injury by accident causation requirement
is unduly harsh, however, because it operates to deny compensation for any
injury that does not have an external cause or unusual conditions, even if the
injury was in fact work related. Furthermore, because it acts as an irrebuttable
presumption based upon the merely arguable theory that an injury that is not
surrounded by unusual circumstances of some kind is not job related, the in-
jury by accident causation requirement is highly arbitrary. Although the re-
quirement applies to every injury, it usually becomes crucial only in claims for
injuries that may have involved natural degeneration, such as hernias and rup-
has only a "minor contributory influence on the development of the ordinary forms of hernia."
Id (citing L. NYHUS & H. HARKINS, HERNIA (1964)).
Any force that causes extension, rotation or compression of the back is capable of producing
spinal injury. lB R. GRAY, ATrORNEY'S TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE 1 14.04 (1968). There are
many different types of injuries associated with the lower back. Many involve fracture or disloca-
tion of the intervertebral disc. The medical cause of lower back injury and the relationship be-
tween it and job exertion is better understood than that of heart attacks but less understood than
that of hernia. Mitchell, supra.
162. See IB LARSON, supra note 23, § 38.81.
163. This component is a general test of the causal connection between work and injury. An
injury must be a "natural and probable consequence" of the work to pass this requirement. See,
e.g., Taylor v. Twin City Club, 260 N.C. 435, 132 S.E.2d 865 (1963).
164. This component specifically tests the time, place and circumstances under which the acci-
dent occurred. An injury is in the course of employment ifit occurs during the hours of and at the
place of employment while the claimant was actually performing job duties. See, e.g., Harless v.
Flynn, I N.C. App. 448, 162 S.E.2d 47 (1968).
165. See IB LARSON, supra note 23, § 38.81.
166. See id
[Vol. 59
INJUR Y B Y ACCIDENT
tured discs, because these types of injuries typically occur in the absence of an
external cause and unusual conditions.
IV. CRITICISMS OF NORTH CAROLINA'S INJURY
BY ACCIDENT REQUIREMENT
.4. Irrelevance to Question of Causation
The fundamental criticism of the injury by accident requirement is that it
is neither a rational nor a well-fitted test of causation. 167 The presence or
absence of an external cause or unusual conditions has only a slight rational
bearing on the question whether an injury is job related. Existence of an ex-
ternal cause may be an indication that an injury is work related, although it
might not be, as, for example, when the external cause is a tornado. 168 Exist-
ence of unusual conditions is an even more unreliable indication of work-
relatedness because the unusual nature of circumstances surrounding an in-
jury has little logical bearing on whether job activity caused the injury. More
importantly, the absence of an external cause or unusual conditions provides
no rational basis for the arbitrary conclusion that an injury is not job re-
lated.' 69 Absence of these conditions indicates only that the circumstances
surrounding the occurrence of the injury were ordinary, and ordinariness of
circumstances is a poor indication of the job relatedness of an injury. Indeed,
because factors foreign to the job environment have not been introduced, the
absence of an external cause or unusual conditions is arguably an indication
that an injury is job related. Yet, under the current interpretation of the stat-
ute, lack of an external cause or unusual conditions automatically precludes
issuing an award. Thus, the court may reach a decision without ever squarely
addressing the crucial issue of causation.
The following example illustrates the irrelevance of the external cause
and unusual conditions tests to the question of causation. Suppose that two
workers, a clerk and a laborer, have hearts in similar condition. The clerk
suffers a heart attack when he undertakes the unusual job of carrying file fold-
ers. The laborer suffers a heart attack when performing his usual task of lift-
ing heavy cement bags. Because neither injury had an external cause, the
court would apply the unusual conditions test. The laborer would probably
fail the test and be automatically disqualified from benefits, but the clerk's
claim would probably pass.170 It would seem, however, that the laborer's in-
jury was more probably caused by his heavy work than the clerk's injury was
167. For similar criticisms, see Edwards v. Piedmont Publishing Co., 227 N.C. 184, 190-92, 41
S.E.2d 592, 596-97 (1947) (Seawell, J., concurring); 1B LARSON, supra note 23, § 38.81.
168. See Walker v. J.D. Wilkins, Inc., 212 N.C. 627, 194 S.E. 89 (1937).
169. 1B LARsoN, supra note 23, § 38.81. Job-related injuries can occur in the absence of exter-
nal causes and unusual conditions.
170. After passing the injury by accident test, the clerk's claim would be measured under the
other two requirements in the compensation formula. General causal connection would be tested
under the "arising out of" component. See note 163 supra. The time, place, and circumstances
under which the accident occurred would be examined under the "in the course of" requirement.
See note 164 supra.
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caused by his light work. The important question in both cases is whether
there was a causal connection in fact between the work and the injury. Com-
parison of usual work conditions with work conditions at the time of the injury
is simply irrelevant to this inquiry.
The same problem can be illustrated by comparing two North Carolina
cases. In Byrd v. Farmers Federation Cooperative,17 1 claimant, the manager of
a farmers co-op store, ruptured a disc while lifting a 100 pound fertilizer bag.
His job duties included lifting fertilizer bags and there was no evidence that he
was not healthy at the time of the injury. Benefits were denied on the ground
that there were no unusual conditions. 172 In Soles v. Stephens Farm Equipment
Co. ,173 claimant ruptured his disc attempting, while in an awkward position,
to lift a tire. His job duties as manager of a farm equipment store did not
involve lifting tires. Claimant had ruptured a disc on a prior occasion.174
Finding that the unusual and awkward lifting of the tire constituted an unu-
sual condition, the court awarded compensation. 175 Neither case involved an
external cause, and the Byrd claim was defeated by an application of the unu-
sual conditions test while the Soles claim passed. Yet the existence of the
unusual conditions in Soles did not add any rational assurance that the injury
suffered by claimant in Soles was more job related than that suffered by claim-
ant in Byrd. In fact, because the Soles claimant had a pre-existing injury, it
would seem plausible that the Byrd injury was more truly work related.
While the examples presented to this point have involved close questions,
it is apparent that the external cause and unusual conditions requirements
have been employed to defeat claims for injuries that are unquestionably job
related. For example, claimant in Johnson v. Erwin Cotton Mills Co. 176 was a
seamstress whose usual job duties included reaching for and drawing sheets
from left to right. At the time of her injury she stretched "real hard," felt
something slip, and felt pain in her arm and shoulder.177 The injury was diag-
nosed as myositis-inflammation and strain of the shoulder muscle. Although
it is difficult to imagine a more job-related injury, benefits were denied be-
cause of lack of an external cause or unusual conditions.178 In O'Mary v. Land
Clearing Corp. ,179 claimant was employed to supervise the cleaning up of
rough, rugged land recently cleared by bulldozer. His job involved walking
over the land, and one day he noticed a broken blister on his toe. The toe
became infected and had to be amputated. Compensation was denied because
171. 260 N.C. 215, 132 S.E.2d 348 (1963).
172. Id at 216, 132 S.E.2d at 349.
173. 8 N.C. App. 658, 175 S.E.2d 339 (1970).
174. The injury occurred seven years prior to the injury for which compensation was claimed.
Claimant had undergone corrective surgery and claimant's doctor stated that treatment relating to
the old injury had not been given for one or two years. Id at 659-60, 175 S.E.2d at 340-41.
175. Id at 661, 175 S.E.2d at 342.
176. 232 N.C. 321, 59 S.E.2d 828 (1950).
177. Id
178. Id at 322, 59 S.E.2d at 829.
179. 261 N.C. 508, 135 S.E.2d 193 (1964).
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of lack of an external cause or unusual conditions 80 even though the injury
seems to have been clearly job related.
The cases and examples discussed above illustrate that the external cause
and unusual conditions tests are very poor methods for determining the job
relatedness of an injury. There is a strong probability that unusual conditions
can be present when the injury is not work related 81 and that unusual condi-
tions can be absent when the injury is work related. Application of the third
causation test actually hinders consideration of relevant causation questions
and arbitrarily defeats seemingly meritorious claims before they can be put to
a true causation test.
B. Unwarranted Statutory Construction
North Carolina's interpretation is unwarranted as a matter of statutory
construction, especially in light of the remedial nature of the Act.' 82 The
meaning of the phrase "injury by accident" is somewhat ambiguous. While
the word "injury" denotes only a result, the word "accident" can mean either
an unexpected cause or an unexpected result. It has been argued that, because
the statute uses both words and connects them with the word "by," the word
"accident" must be interpreted as denoting a cause.' 83 Thus, before there can
be an "injury by accident," an external cause must produce the injury. On the
other hand, the statute was construed as an entirely different manner in Fenton
v. J Thorley & Co. 184 The House of Lords reasoned there that the words "by
accident" appeared in the statute merely to exclude injuries that were not un-
expected, such as those that were intentional and that the phrase did not im-
pose an external cause requirement. Thus, the sustaining of an unexpected
injury was an "injury by accident."
The most reasonable statutory interpretation consistent with the policy of
the Act is the Fenton construction. This construction is more consistent with
the popular meaning of the word "accident" and would seem to be more in
keeping with legislative intent and understanding of the effect of the phrase. It
is a construction that gives legitimate effect and force to all parts of the statute.
The latter interpretation was the one adopted by the House of Lords at a time
almost contemporaneous with passage of the first workers' compensation act,
180. Id at 511, 135 S.E.2d at 195.
181. In this situation the employer has a legitimate complaint. An injury that is not work
related will pass the injury by accident requirement if there are unusual conditions. If, for some
reason, the claim also passes the more traditional causation test of the "arising out of" component,
the employer will be held liable for a non-work-related injury. Because the unusual conditions
test is such a poor guarantee of work-relatedness and because a claim might not receive close
scrutiny under the "arising out of" test if it passes the "injury by accident" test, the potential exists
for unfair allocation of liability to the employer.
182. For similar criticisms, see Edwards v. Piedmont Publishing Co., 227 N.C. 184, 189-93, 41
S.E.2d 592, 596-98 (1947) (Seawell, J., concurring); IB LARSON, supra note 23, § 38.61.
183. See Purity Biscuit Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 115 Utah 1, 25-30, 201 P.2d 961, 973-75
(1949) (Latimer, J., dissenting). But see Redman Warehousing Corp. v. Industrial Commission,
22 Utah 2d 398, 454 P.2d 283 (1969); Mellen v. Industrial Commission, 19 Utah 2d 373, 431 P.2d
798 (1967).
184. [1903] A.C. 443. See note 30 supra.
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and it is the construction in the overwhelming majority of American jurisdic-
tions.1 85 On the other hand, the former, more conservative interpretation of
the statute is the type of "technical, narrow and strict interpretation"' 186 that
the North Carolina courts have declared improper in construing the Act.
18 7
C Inconsistent and Seemingly Capricious Results
Another fundamental criticism of North Carolina's interpretation of the
injury by accident requirement is-that it cannot be rationally applied. 188 Per-
haps the best criticism of the interpretation is the widely divergent results of
the cases in which the unusual conditions rule has been applied. Decisions in
cases with similar facts are frequently so different that application of the rule
seems capricious. 189 The unusual conditions rule is unworkable in practice
because it is premised on the incorrect assumption that there is an objectively
measurable quantum of usual conditions that surround job performance.19 0
Yet job duties naturally and unavoidably vary constantly within the same job
from more to less usual depending upon a multitude of factors. Because the
assumption that there is a quantum of usual work conditions is simply not
supported in actual experience, decision-making under the unusual conditions
rule requires the court to grasp at and magnify questionable distinctions in the
minutiae of job performance. Inconsequential considerations, such as slight
differences in weight lifted or exertion required, are frequently the unusual
conditions upon which ultimate decisions of compensability rest.19 1 Because
185. See text accompanying notes 205-08 infra.
186. Johnson v. Asheville Hosiery Co., 199 N.C. 38, 40, 153 S.E.2d 591, 593 (1930).
187. The language of North Carolina's special statute governing compensability of hernias
arguably provides a somewhat more legitimate basis for judicial interpretation of the "injury by
accident" language as an external cause requirement. A hernia is not compensable under the
special statute unless it "immediately followed an accident." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(18)(d)
(1979). It is arguable that this language more clearly separates the "injury" requirement from the
"accident" requirement and is thus a clearer indication that the "accident" must be an external
cause. Even this argument, however, can be criticized. First, the supreme court has never stated
that the special statute imposes a higher or different "accident" requirement than the "accident"
requirement in the general statute. Second, the language of the statute, liberally construed, does
comport with medical understanding of how a hernia is sustained. Because a hernia is the condi-
tion that immediately follows a rupture of the stomach wall, a hernia does immediately follow an
event (the unexpected rupture) that could be described as an accident. See Mitchell, .upra note
161. Thus, if the court were to hold that an unexpected internal result could be an accident, the
hernia statute would not prevent compensation. Third, hernia statutes similar to North Carolina's
have been construed in other jurisdictions to permit compensation of the unexpected hernia alone.
See Gulf States Creosoting Co. v. Walker, 224 Ala. 104, 106, 139 So. 261, 262 (1932); Hardware
Mut. Cas. Co. v. Sprayberry, 195 Ga. 393, 394-95, 24 S.E.2d 315, 316-17 (1943).
188. For similar criticisms, see Edwards v. Piedmont Publishing Co., 227 N.C. 184, 190-91, 41
S.E.2d 592, 596-97 (1947) (Seawell, J., concurring); IB LARSON, supra note 23, § 38.63.
189. See text accompanying notes 192-97 supra.
190. Every job involves work under different conditions because there is always, for example,
fast work and slow work, and hard work as well as easy work. It is impossible to tell whether a
stock boy's lifting of the heaviest case of groceries that he will lift that year is work under usual or
unusual conditions. Larson states that "a surprising number of cases" hold that the injury by
accident requirement is satisfied when the worker was simply performing the heaviest part of his
usual work. IB LARSON, supra note 23, § 38.63.
191. Moore v. Engineering & Sales Co., 214 N.C. 424, 199 S.E. 605 (1938), and Edwards v.
Piedmont Publishing Co., 227 N.C. 184, 41 S.E.2d 592 (1947), are examples of cases in which the
court elevated trivial circumstances into conditions unusual enough to support awards.
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decisions depend upon subjective judgments about what usual duties were and
upon hair-splitting distinctions concerning conditions at the time of the injury,
application of the unusual conditions rule results in confusion and irreconcila-
ble results.
A comparison of three cases-Beamon v. Stop and Shop Grocery,192
Rhinehart v. Roberts Super Market, Inc. ,193 and McMahan v. Hickey's Super-
market 194-serves to illustrate the problems encountered in applying the unu-
sual conditions rule. In Beamon, claimant was a grocery store checkout clerk
whose regular job duties included bagging groceries. She suffered a back in-
jury when she picked up a twenty pound bag of charcoal from the bottom of a
grocery cart. Although she did not ordinarily handle charcoal bags, there was
nothing unusual about the manner in which she lifted the bag. Compensation
was denied because of lack of unusual conditions.' 95 In Rhinehart, claimant
was a grocery store stock boy who sustained a back injury while lifting, turn-
ing, and tossing a forty-eight pound case of soup cans to another worker. His
regular job duties included lifting cases of groceries, although he usually han-
dled cases alone. The Commission awarded compensation but the court re-
versed, concluding that claimant's twisting motion and toss to another worker
did not constitute sufficient unusual conditions. 96 In McMahan, claimant
was a grocery store clerk and bag boy whose regular duties included lifting
and loading cases of groceries. After lifting a fifty-five pound case of dog food
from the floor and carrying it to a customer's two-door hardtop car, he suf-
fered a hernia while placing it in the cramped back seat. Compensation was
awarded, the unusual condition being that this was the first time claimant had
loaded a case in the back seat of such a car in a cramped position. 197
The results of these cases cannot be rationally harmonized. Although all
injuries were sustained while the claimants were performing essentially ordi-
nary job duties, all cases involved some unusual conditions. It is difficult to
understand, and the cases do not explain, why lifting and placing an object in
a cramped position is more unusual than lifting an object not usually lifted or
lifting and twisting with an object. Certainly no difference is apparent that
could reasonably account for the differing outcomes. In fact, all activities
seem equally as inherently usual or unusual. Thus, the cases illustrate that
there is no objective measure of unusual conditions, that decisions rest upon
insignificant distinctions and that the standard cannot be rationally applied.
192. 27 N.C. App. 553, 219 S.E.2d 508 (1975).
193. 271 N.C. 586, 157 S.E.2d 1 (1967).
194. 24 N.C. App. 113, 210 S.E.2d 214 (1974).
195. 27 N.C. App. at 555, 219 S.E.2d at 509.
196. 271 N.C. at 588, 157 S.E.2d at 3. Although claimant's injury involved a congenital condi-
tion, the medical testimony was that work could have "precipitated" the injury. Id at 587, 157
S.E.2d at 2. Although the court did not discuss whether the existence of the pre-existing condition
was significant, this factor may have influenced the decision to deny compensation.
197. 24 N.C. App. at 116, 210 S.E.2d at 215.
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D. Conflict with the Policy Underlying Workers' Compensation
The injury by accident requirement is unjustified because it is contrary to
the basic principles of workers' compensation. The policy determination un-
derlying enactment of workers' compensation was that industry, and ulti-
mately consumers, should bear the cost of work-related injuries. l98 Workers,
who before workers' compensation often suffered great hardship when they
sustained injury, gave up their right to sue for damages in return for the prom-
ise of certain, if limited, compensation for work-related injuries. 199 The earli-
est rule in North Carolina, as well as most other jurisdictions, was that the
remedial acts should be liberally construed in favor of claimants. 2°° The
court's current construction of the injury by accident requirement arbitrarily
and unfairly denies compensation for some injuries that are unquestionably
work related as well as for other injuries that may not be work related. Re-
quiring workers to bear the cost of work-related injuries, however, violates the
fundamental principle upon which workers' compensation systems were en-
acted. Even in situations in which work connection is a close question and
perhaps ultimately unanswerable with medical certainty, as in some degenera-
tive injury cases, the rule of liberal construction should prevail and compensa-
tion should be granted. The effect of the injury by accident construction is to
reallocate the risk of injuries previously allocated by the legislature and to
shift the burden of these injuries from society to the individual worker.20 t
Some workers' compensation acts received early interpretations.20 2 This
was natural in view of the systems' then radical concept and the desire to
avoid placing potentially vast liability on employers. As the courts and society
came to accept workers' compensation as a fair system necessary to modern
industrial life, however, these strict constructions were overruled and modi-
fied.20 3 Early constructions of the "injury by accident" component similar to
North Carolina's have been expressly overruled in many states on public pol-
icy grounds.2°4 Currently, although twenty-six jurisdictions have statutes sim-
ilar to North Carolina's, 205 only one other state applies a rule similar to North
198. See text accompanying notes 19-20supra. For a full discussion of the policies of workers'
compensation, see COMPENDIUM, supra note 18, at 21-26.
199. See Conrad v. Cook-Lewis Foundry Co., 198 N.C. 723, 725-26, 153 S.E. 226, 268 (1930)
(quoting Stertz v. Industrial Ins. Comm'n, 91 Wash. 588, 590, 158 P. 256, 258 (1916)).
200. See text accompanying note 39 supra.
201. The current interpretation of the requirement is reminiscent of the common-law defense
of assumption of risk because, under it, benefits are denied when injury is sustained while per-
forming typical or normal work.
202. Larson, Basic Concepts and Objectives of Workmen's Compensation, in 1 SUPPLEMENTAL
STUDIES FOR THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS 33 (M.
Berkowitz ed. 1973).
203. S. HoRovrrz, CURRENT TRENDS IN WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 472-77 (1947).
204. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Michigan Nat'1 Bank, 348 Mich. 577, 83 N.W.2d 614 (1957); Ciuba
v. Irvington Varnish & Insulator Co., 27 N.J. 127, 141 A.2d 761 (1958); Stout v. N.D. Workmen's
Compensation Bureau, 236 N.W.2d 889 (N.D. Sup. Ct. 1975). In Stout, the court stated that the
arbitrary requirement that had been interpreted to arise under the "injury by accident" compo-
nent was "historically incorrect, logically unsound, and impractical in operation." Id at 894.
205. IB LARSON, supra note 23, § 37.10. The statutes are similar in that they all contain the
phrase injury "by accident." Nine other states use the phrase "accidental injury." Id
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Carolina's injury by accident requirement to all types of injuries.206 Only ap-
proximately nine other states require some type of unusual circumstances in
cases involving heart injuries.207 In the vast majority of states the unexpected
sustaining of any type of injury satisfies the injury requirement. 208
E. Conclusion
Continued use of the external cause and unusual conditions tests to deter-
mine whether there has been an injury by accident cannot be justified. The
tests are not supported by the language of the statute, their application pro-
duces inconsistent results, and they conflict with the remedial policy of work-
ers' compensation. Most importantly, the tests are not rational or wel-fitted
tests of causation. Although the requirements have been employed to defeat
claims in which work connection was questionable, 20 9 in many of these cases
the claim could have been as easily defeated by application of a more sensible
causation test. Indeed, in a few cases the North Carolina Supreme Court itself
has held that there was a lack of both injury by accident and true causation,210
demonstrating that a more rational causation test can dispose of questionable
claims.
The one situation in which there may be some justification for using an
arbitrary test is where the medical cause of the injury is truly unknown. Em-
ployers should not be liable for injuries for which the cause is truly unknown
simply because they occur during working hours. If an arbitrary test is used in
these situations it should assign responsibility to the most probable source of
the injury. Even if the necessity of an arbitrary test is admitted, however,
North Carolina's external cause and unusual conditions rules can be criticized
on two grounds. First, the tests can and have been applied to a wide variety of
injuries, including those for which true medical causation can be deter-
206. That state is Missouri. See id §§ 38.20, .30.
207. See id § 38.71. The figure is only approximate because decisions are often imprecise and
contradictory. Id Larson states that the number ofjurisdictions that hold the unexpected injury
itself compensable is three to one over the number that do not. Id § 38.30.
208. See id § 38.71. This majority is made up of states that have a statutory "accident" re-
quirement but hold that it is satisfied by the unexpected sustaining of an injury and of states that
do not have such a statutory requirement, so that the injury by accident issue does not even arise.
See id §§ 38.30, .71.
209. See, eg., cases cited at note 140 supra.
210. See Lewter v. Abercrombie Enterprises, Inc., 240 N.C. 399, 82 S.E.2d 410 (1954); Duncan
v. City of Charlotte, 234 N.C. 86, 66 S.E.2d 22 (1951). In other cases the court has supported its
conclusion that there was not an injury by accident by extensive discussion of medical testimony
and the question of actual medical causation, so that it appears that lack of causation was the real
basis of the decision. See Ferrell v. Montgomery & Aldridge Sales Co., 262 N.C. 76, 136 S.E.2d
227 (1964); Bellamy v. Morace Stevedoring Co., 258 N.C. 327, 128 S.E.2d 395 (1962).
The case of Lutes v. Export Leaf Tobacco Co., 19 N.C. App. 380, 198 S.E.2d 746 (1973),
illustrates that claims can be properly disposed of by using a traditional causation test exclusively.
In Lutes the court concluded that claimant had sustained an injury by accident but denied the
claim because there was no causal connection between the injury and his work. Id at 383, 198
S.E.2d at 748. In Moore v. Summers Drug Co., 206 N.C. 711, 175 S.E. 96 (1934), a case decided
before the modem injury by accident requirements were developed, a claim for heart attack was
denied on the single ground of lack of causation. Id at 713, 175 S.E. at 97.
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mined.2 11 Second, the tests do a poor job of determining even the probable
source of an injury.
V. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
There are several alternatives to North Carolina's current method for
handling the important causation problems raised in the administration of
workers' compensation. All the alternatives examined below deal forthrightly
with the causation problem presented by degenerative injuries, something the
North Carolina approach does not do. Although these alternative causation
tests vary from conservative to liberal, all are more successful in discriminat-
ing among claims than the current "injury by accident" interpretation. Fi-
nally, the alternatives are not mutually exclusive; different approaches could
be applied in the same jurisdiction depending upon the particular kind of in-
jury involved.
A. Applying the Injury By Accident Requirement Only to Heart Attacks and
Injuries That Do Not Involve Sudden Rupture
North Carolina could apply its interpretation of the injury by accident
requirement only in cases involving heart attacks and injuries that do not in-
volve sudden rupture;212 injuries involving sudden ruptures, 213 such as hernias
and ruptured discs, would not have to pass the extra causation test. Approxi-
mately eight states make this distinction in applying a type of unusual condi-
tions test.214 The jurisdictions that do not apply an extra causation test in
cases involving sudden ruptures do so on the theory that proving causation for
sudden ruptures is less difficult than for heart attacks and nonsudden inju-
ries.215 Both common sense and medical knowledge provide some support for
211. See text accompanying notes 176-80 supra.
212. The category of heart attack cases includes all the cases that involve damage to the heart.
Injuries that do not involve sudden rupture are injuries such as back sprain, bursitis, muscle strain,
and spasm, and aggravation of pre-existing conditions. Larson categorizes these injuries as arising
from "generalized conditions." See IB LARSON, supra note 23, § 38.30.
213. Injuries that involve sudden rupture include hernia, ruptured discs, and cerebral hemor-
rhage. These injuries are associated with actual "breaking" of the body and sudden structural
change. Larson categorizes them as "breakage" injuries. See IB LARSON, supra note 23, § 38.20.
214. The states are Colorado, Florida, Indiana, Kansas, South Carolina, South Dakota, Wash-
ington, and Wyoming. See states listed at IB LARSON, supra note 23, § 38.20 at 7-17 n.20, 7-29
n.21, 7-43 n.28, & 7-44 nn.34, 35, 36.1 & 37; states listed at IB LARSON, supra note 23, § 38.30 at 7-
77 to -99 n.52. Such a breakdown can only be approximate because opinions are not precise and
decisions are sometimes inconsistent.
215. See, e.g., Boeing v. Fine, 65 Wash. 2d 169, 171-73, 396 P.2d 145, 147 (1964), in which the
court stated:
The fundamental differences between heart attacks and back injuries are such as to
render the 'unusual exertion test irrelevant when transplanted into the area of the law
dealing with injuries to the skeletal structure of the body. . . . A heart attack. . . is
largely related to long-term disease, and may be unrelated to the particular employment
hazard to which the worker may be subjected. . . . Contrast this to injuries of the back.
It is quite possible that a slight or usual strain applied at an unusually different angle
could... overpower and injure a normal back.. . . An unthinking or automatic appli-
cation of the heart rule to the mechanical structures of the body would be unreasonable,
illogical, and unwise.
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this proposition.216 In jurisdictions that make this distinction,217 the unex-
pected occurrence of the injury-the accidental result itself-satisfies the in-
jury by accident requirement for sudden ruptures. 218 The only causation test
for sudden injuries is the test of strict medical causation-the question
whether the injury was actually caused by the work. The test's source is the
"arising out of' component of the statute. Although this alternative is only a
slight reform, dropping use of the arbitrary standard and employment of a
true causation test in the case of sudden ruptures would permit compensation
ofjob-related injuries of this type even if they were sustained without an exter-
nal cause or unusual conditions.
B. Adoption of New York's "Wear and Tear" Rule
North Carolina could adopt New York's "wear and tear" rule.219 Under
the New York rule, as under North Carolina's unusual conditions rule, an
extra, arbitrary causation test is imposed in all cases in which the injury does
not have an obvious external cause. An injury is not compensable unless it has
an external cause or meets the extra causation test.220 Of course in New York,
as in North Carolina, medical causation in fact must also be established. 221
A claim will pass the wear and tear test only if the exertion used to per-
form the job activity that resulted in injury was greater than exertion exper-
ienced in the wear and tear of ordinary nonemployment life.222 Unlike the
See also IB LARSON, supra note 23, §§ 38.71-.73, .81.
216. The distinction seems to be based at least in part on definiteness of the injury produced.
Because a sudden injury, such as a hernia, produces a definite and immediate change, it is easier
to attribute causation to the immediate environment. Furthermore, the etiology, or medical cause,
of hernia and lower back injuries is somewhat easier to establish than that of heart attacks. See
Mitchell, supra note 161, at 355.
217. The distinction between heart cases and nonsudden injuries and injuries involving sud-
den rupture for purposes of imposing an extra causation test has been criticized. See IB LARSON,
supra note 23, § 38.73. It is argued that the elements that have sometimes been said to give some
assurance of causation-definiteness and immediacy-are just as present in the heart attack situa-
tion as in the sudden injury situation. This criticism fails to recognize that the distinction may be
justified simply because it is easier to determine the medical cause of such injuries as hernias and
ruptured discs.
218. lB LARSON, supra note 23, § 38.20.
219. The evolution and content of the New York rule is examined in great detail in IB LAR-
SON, supra note 23, § 38.64(a). The rule is apparently traceable to the case of Burris v. Lewis, 2
N.Y.2d 323, 141 N.E.2d 424, 160 N.Y.S.2d 853 (1957).
220. In New York, the extra arbitrary causation test can be met in any one of three ways. One
way is by satisfying the wear and tear standard. The two other ways to meet the test are to
establish that work at the time of injury required greater exertion than the worker's own usual
work or greater exertion than the usual work of other employees. See lB LARSON, supra note23,
§ 38.64(a).
221. See Burris v. Lewis, 2 N.Y.2d 323, 141 N.E.2d 424, 160 N.Y.S.2d 853 (1957), in which an
award was reversed for lack of causal connection between work and injury regardless of the na-
ture of external conditions.
222. For a typical application of the standard, see Lerner v. Terrycab Co., 20 A.D.2d 615, 616-
17, 245 N.Y.S.2d 565, 566-67 (1963). Job exertion is compared with the typical nonemployment
exertion encountered in any hypothetical person's life. Whether job exertion was greater than this
rather vague, arbitrary standard is a question of fact, id at 567, that is to be determined from the
"common-sense viewpoint of the average man." Masse v. James H. Robinson Co., 301 N.Y. 34,
37, 92 N.E.2d 56, 57 (1950).
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North Carolina claimant, the New York claimant who is injured while per-
forming usual work under usual conditions may still recover if his job exertion
was greater than the ordinary wear and tear of life. 223 The wear and tear rule
and the unusual conditions rule serve the same function because they both
arbitrarily deny compensation when external conditions reveal that the work-
relatedness of an injury may be suspect. The New York standard is superior
to the North Carolina standard, however, because it compares factors that
have a more rational bearing on the work-relatedness of the injury.224 If an
injury occurs during work exertion that is not greater than the exertion of
ordinary life, there are some reasonable grounds for the general presumption
that the injury is not job related. If work exertion is greater than ordinary
wear and tear, there is some rational basis for concluding that the injury may
be work related. Although application of New York's arbitrary rule undoubt-
edly leads to denial of some work-related claims, the wear and tear rule is
preferable if it is felt that a bright-line standard is necessary to keep an ulti-
mate check on causation.
C Adoption of Professor Larson's Two-Step Approach to
Proof of Causation
North Carolina could adopt the two-step approach to proof of causation
proposed by Professor Larson, a leading authority on workers' compensation
law.2 25 Under this alternative the "injury by accident" component is not re-
garded as a causation requirement. It is satisfied by the unexpected sustaining
of an injury.226 Causation is measured under two different tests, one for legal
and one for medical causation, that are derived from the "arising out of" com-
ponent of the statute. To satisfy the legal causation test, the claimant who had
a pre-existing condition must show that job exertion at the time of injury was
greater than that of nonemployment life;227 the claimant without a pre-ex-
isting condition need only show that job activity was the medical cause of his
223. See, e.g., Dodson v. Frank Vanecek & Son, 24 A.D.2d 787, 263 N.Y.S.2d 774 (1965), in
which benefits were claimed for the death of a mason's helper who suffered a ruptured aneurysm
while shoveling sand. Although the worker was performing his usual work under usual conditions
at the time of injury, compensation was awarded because the work itself was more strenuous than
the ordinary wear and tear of life.
224. Under the unusual conditions rule, usual job conditions are compared to conditions at
the time of injury; under the wear and tear rule, exertion of ordinary life is compared with job
exertion at the time of injury. Comparing job conditions at the time of injury with usual job
conditions reveals little about the qualities of the work that might have been capable of actually
causing injury. See text accompanying notes 160-65 supra. Comparison of job exertion at the
time of injury with ordinary nonemployment exertion provides a standard by which to judge
whether job exertion was strenuous or extreme. The information revealed by the wear and tear
test, therefore, does have a rational relationship to the question whether an injury was job related.
225. See lB LARSON, supra note 23, § 38.83.
226. Larson argues that this proposal "can hardly be considered revolutionary" because this
was the original meaning given to the "injury by accident" component in England. Id Under
this interpretation, the number of denials for lack of injury by accident would be small because
few workers would continue at their tasks if they genuinely expected to sustain an injury. Id
227. Id This arbitrary standard employed for cases involving pre-existing conditions is the
same as New York's wear and tear rule. For a discussion of the wear and tear rule, see text
accompanying notes 219-24 supra.
[Vol. 59
INJUR Y B YA CCIDENT
injury.228 To satisfy the test of medical causation, all claimants must show, as
a matter of medical fact, that job activity "contributed causally" 229 to the in-
jury.230 This alternative thus applies a strict medical causation test for all in-
juries and an additional arbitrary legal test only in those cases in which
suspicion about work-relatedness is highest-those involving a pre-existing
condition.23 '
D. Abandonment of Proof of Medical Causation and Adoption of an
Arbitrary Legal Causation Standard
North Carolina could reject the need to prove actual medical causation
for some types of injuries and award compensation whenever work conditions
satisfy an arbitrary legal causation standard.232 Under this alternative the fa-
miliar principle that an injury must be causally connected to the work before it
is compensable is frankly abandoned. This radical approach is based upon the
recognition that it is extremely difficult, under current medical knowledge, to
determine the true medical cause of some injuries, particularly those involving
the heart. 233 Reasonable medical views may be diametrically opposed on the
question whether work actually caused or even contributed to the cause of a
particular injury.234 It is contended that, in such situations, attempting to
make principled disposition of injury claims on the basis of whether they were
medically related to the job is impossible.235 Thus, application of the medical
test only leads to confusion and unpredictable decisions. Elimination of the
medical causation test and adoption of a legal standard as the sole causation
test, the argument proceeds, would make decision-making more predictable
228. IB LARSON, supra note 23, § 38.83.
229. Id § 38.83, at 7-237.
230. 1B LARSON, supra note 23, § 38.83. The same test, strict medical causation, is both the
legal and medical test in cases in which the claimant did not have a pre-existing condition.
231. This scheme is justified by analogy to the distinction between neutral risk situations and
personal risk situations that is usually associated with analysis of problems relating to the "arising
out of" component of the statute. Id It is argued that if the worker contributes a personal risk of
injury in the form of a pre-existing condition, it is appropriate to require him to prove that em-
ployment contributed an even greater risk in the form of exertion greater than that of nonemploy-
ment life. If the worker did not contribute a personal risk, it is appropriate to charge the work
environment with the injury because, by simply placing the worker at the location of injury, the
work was more responsible than the worker for creating the injury. Id
232. This proposal has been suggested by Cohen & Klein, supra note 161.
233. See note 161 supra.
234. Cohen and Klein assert that at least four factors help create situations involving greatly
conflicting testimony about causal connection. The problem of "purchased loyalty" is an obvious
factor, but the cause of medical disagreement is much deeper. The most important factor is the
genuine lack of medical agreement about the medical cause of heart attacks. Another factor is
at existing law compels litigants to adopt extreme medical opinions because testimony that there
were mixed personal and job causes does the employer no good. The employer must usually pay
full compensation if there is any significant work-related cause, even if the worker had a pre-
existing condition. The fourth factor is that, because of the different legal and medical concepts of
causation, medical testimony may not be addressed to the legal question at issue. Cohen & Klein,
supra note 161, at 181. Cohen and Klein note that it is never difficult for a party to choose as an
expert witness a physician whose views coincide with his legal position and that almost every
contested claim involves conflicting medical testimony. Id They express the fear that the success
of claims hinge on the persuasive ability of the parties' physicians.
235. Id
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and consistent 236 and no less arbitrary than it already is. 2 3 7 Under this alter-
native awards would be granted merely upon proof that the external condi-
tions surrounding the injury met a clearly defined standard.238 Any arbitrary
standard, such as the unusual conditions rule, could be adopted. The wear
and tear rule, however, is preferable because it is a better measure of job relat-
edness.239 This alternative should be applied, of course, only when the cause
of an injury is very difficult to determine. 240
E. Application of a Pure Medical Causation Test Alone
North Carolina could refuse to employ an arbitrary causation test and
instead apply the test of pure medical causation as the only causation require-
ment for all injuries. Compensability would simply depend upon whether the
injury was in fact caused by the work. The injury by accident requirement
would be satisfied upon the occurrence of an unexpected injury, regardless of
external conditions. The source of the causation test would be the "arising out
of' component of the statute. This alternative has been adopted in the great
majority of states,241 and it has been recommended by both the National
236. Cohen and Klein claim that decision-making under an arbitrary legal standard such as
"wear and tear of life" or "unusual conditions" "should present little difficulty." Id at 185. This
assertion is suspect in light of, for example, the problems North Carolina has encountered in
Oving definition to the concept of unusual conditions. The proposed alternative, however, exam-
mes only external conditions and claims are measured under only one test. On balance, decision-
making might be somewhat more predictable.
237. This alternative is based solely upon application of an arbitrary standard. Cohen and
Klein assert, however, that decision-making under the medical cause in fact test is also arbitrary
because answering that test for some types of injuries is beyond the expertise of medical science.
Id at 182.
238. Id at 183. Admitting that their alternative does not purport to determine actual causa-
tion, Cohen and Klein state that the test would simply "represent a policy statement by the legisla-
ture as to which claims should be charged to the system and which should be charged to other
sources, thereby providing a greater degree of predictability and consistency." Id at 186. The
authors suggest that states employ the wear and tear rule as the arbitrary standard. It is contended
that use of this standard to dispose of claims is responsible and fair because the standard is fairly
successful at distinguishing between purely personal injuries and injuries that are at least partly
job related. Id
As an example of how this alternative would function if the arbitrary standard were the wear
and tear rule, suppose that we have two employees, one a laborer who usually lifted heavy steel
blocks and the other an office worker. If the laborer had a heart attack while performing usual
work, he would receive compensation because he was undergoing obviously great exertion. If the
office worker had a heart attack while moving a six pound table, however, he would not receive
compensation because he was not undergoing exertion greater than ordinary life. Actual causa-
tion is not relevant in either case. The awards would not be altered even if the office worker could
prove his injury was job related and the laborer's employer could establish that the laborer's
injury was not job related.
The sustainin& of an unexpected injury would satisfy the "injury by accident" component
under this alternative. The causation test would be imposed under the "arising out of" compo-
nent. Id at 184.
239. Id
240. Only heart disease is discussed in Cohen and Klein's proposal. The extremely difficult
causation question and the magnitude of the problem distinguish cardiac cases from other inju-
ries. The authors do state, however, that their proposal "could certainly be applied to other pre-
existing diseases, especially those such as cancer, in which the causative factors are highly un-
known." Id at 186.
241. See lB LARSON, supra note 23, § 38.71. Only five states employ an arbitrary causation
test for injuries such as cerebral hemorrhages; only 10 states employ an arbitrary test for heart
[Vol. 59
INJURY B Y ACCIDENT
Commission on State Workmen's Compensation Laws242 and the Council of
State Governments. 243 Although the various medical causation tests differ in
their wording of the degree of required causal connection between the injury
and work-employing such phrases as "significant cause," 2 4 "contributed in
some material degree," 245 and "contributed causally" 246-the purpose and ef-
fect of the tests are essentially the same.247 In all states that employ the medi-
cal test as the sole test of causation, the only important determination is the
sometimes difficult question whether the injury was in fact so causally related
to the work that it is fair to attribute the cause to the employment environment
and require the employer to pay compensation.
This alternative has been criticized on the ground that it does not ade-
quately screen out non-work-related claims.248 The criticisms are based upon
the recognized difficulty of establishing true medical causation for some inju-
ries, especially degenerative injuries, and the fear that medical science can al-
most always establish at least some medical connection between work and
injury.249 This "floodgates" argument raises the spectre that adoption of the
pure medical causation alternative would effectively destroy the causal con-
nection requirement and turn workers' compensation into a general accident
insurance system.2 50
There is convincing evidence, however, that use of the medical causation
test as the sole causation test does not open the "floodgates" and permit im-
proper awards. 25 ' First, the medical cause of some degenerative injuries such
as hernias and ruptured discs can be established with enough precision to per-
mit rational determination of whether the injury was job related. 252 Although
the medical cause of heart attacks cannot be so precisely determined,25 3 expert
medical opinion is helpful, and judgments about medical causation can be
injuries. Id The general causation requirement of the "arising out of" component must be satis-
fied in all states.
242. The NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS, THE RE-
PORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS 49-52 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as COMMISSION REPORT].
243. THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AND REHABILI-
TATION LAW § 2(a) (2d ed. 1973). The Council proposes that the injury by accident component be
deleted. Id at 83-84.
244. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 242, at 51.
245. Dwyer v. Ford Motor Co., 36 N.J. 487, 493, 178 A.2d 161, 164 (1962).
246. See text accompanying note 229 supra.
247. COMPENDIUM, supra note 18, at 183-84.
248. See Purity Biscuit Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 115 Utah 1, 30, 201 P.2d 961, 975 (1949)
(Latimer, J., dissenting); Cohen & Klein, supra note 161. The difficulty of proving causation for
heart injuries has led the American Heart Association to suggest that all heart cases be removed
from the worker's compensation system. Id at 183.
249. See Cohen & Klein, supra note 161, at 183.
250. Purity Biscuit Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 115 Utah 1, 29-30, 201 P.2d 961, 975 (1949)
(Latimer, J., dissenting).
251. E. CHEIT, supra note 19, at 324-32; IB LARSON, supra note 23, § 38.83; COMMISSION
REPORT, supra note 242, at 35-36.
252. See note 161 supra. The medical cause of hernia and back injuries can be established
with some precision. See Mitchell, supra note 161. Only three states employ an arbitrary causa-
tion test for these injuries. IB LARSON, supra note 23, § 38.20.
253. See note 161 supra.
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made on the basis of "human experience. s25 4 Second, although it is theoreti-
cally possible to determine the medical cause of many types of injuries, it is
often not easy for claimants to establish that their particular injuries were in
fact job related and thus compensable.25 5 The burden of proof of establishing
the causal relationship is always on the claimant. The medical causation tests
require a showing of much more than de minimus causal connection before
compensation is permitted.256 Claims can fail the medical test because of ad-
verse direct physical evidence from autopsies, contrary expert medical opinion
evidence and simple failure to sustain the initial burden.25 7 The causation
requirements imposed by the "in the course of" component provide added
assurance of work relatedness. Third, experience in the vast majority of states
that employ the medical causation test exclusively is evidence that the "flood-
gates" fears are exaggerated. 258 Despite the unquestioned difficulty in some
cases of determining medical causation, most state compensation schemes
function fairly and effectively with the test of pure medical causation.259 Stud-
ies in some of these states show that the number of borderline cases in which
there exists a true causation dispute and in which a causation decision under
the liberal test could result in an arguably improper award is relatively low. 260
If North Carolina adopted the strict medical test as the sole causation test
and held that the injury by accident component did not impose a causation
requirement, job-relatedness of all injuries would be measured under the
"arising out of" component of the statute. In North Carolina, the general de-
gree of causal connection required by the arising out of component is met
when work was a "contributing proximate cause" 261 of the injury or the injury
was a "natural and probable consequence" 262 of the work. These generally
worded tests apply in all situations in which there is a causation question,
including those involving the special causation problems of degenerative inju-
ries. The court has more specifically addressed the question of the requisite
254. Hoffman v. National Sur. Corp., 91 Ga. App. 414, 417, 85 S.E.2d 784, 786 (1955). Evi-
dence of the strenuous nature of the work involved, expert medical opinion evidence and natural
inferences can all aid in determining causation. See LARSON, supra note 23, § 38.83.
255. See E. CHEIT, supra note 19, at 329-30 (citing D. Russell & R. Beard, Heart Disease and
Workmen's Compensation, What are the Costs to the Insurance Carrier? (California Heart Asso-
ciation mimeograph)); IB LARSON, supra note 23, § 38.83.
256. See text accompanying notes 244-47 supra. If injury occurs while a claimant is perform-
ing easy or nonstrenuous work it will be difficult to establish that the employment environment
contributed to the cause of the injury. An injury is not causally related to employment if it was
caused by a pre-existing degenerative condition whose natural progress simply brought it to cli-
max during working hours.
257. See IB LARSON, supra note 23, § 38.83. Larson states that simple failure to prove suffi-
cient medical causation is probably the most common reason for denial of claims. Id
258. See E. CHEIT, supra note 19, at 329-32; IB LARSON, supra note 23, § 38.83. Some of the
factors that work to reduce the number of arguably nonemployment related claims that are
brought are the availability'of assistance from nonoccupational programs such as social security
and private insurance plans and increasing safety standards in the work place.
259. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 242, at 36.
260. E. CHuBT, supra note 19, at 329-32. Studies in New York and California indicate that the
number of disputed heart cases amounts to only a very small number of the total claims actually
filed and benefit awards determined. Id
261. Cole v. Guilford County, 259 N.C. 724, 727, 131 S.E.2d 308, 311 (1963).
262. Taylor v. Twin City Club, 260 N.C. 435, 438, 132 S.E.2d 865, 868 (1963).
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degree of causation in cases that involve pre-existing conditions. The court
has made it clear that, while work did not have to be the sole cause, it had to
"contribute in some reasonable degree" to the injury.2 63 In order to "arise out
of" employment, the injury had to have a "definite discernable relation" to job
activity.264 The basic causation test in North Carolina is thus similar to the
medical causation tests of other jurisdictions, and there is no reason why it
could not adequately serve as the sole test of causation for all injuries.
VI. CONCLUSION
Workers' compensation, the nation's first and oldest form of social insur-
ance, 265 has been much criticized in recent years,266 with the most fundamen-
tal criticism being simply that the various state-administered programs have
failed to provide fair compensation. Many critics have concluded that the cur-
rent workers' compensation system is a failure, and several far-reaching alter-
natives have been suggested for dealing with the problem of employment-
related injuries. 267 In 1971 Congress created a National Commission on State
Workmen's Compensation Laws to investigate the charges aimed at workers'
compensation. 268 The Commission's report was critical of most state laws,
finding them generally "neither adequate nor equitable."269 Alternatives to
the present system were examined, but the Commission concluded that the
most feasible alternative was to retain and reform the present system.270 One
of the Commission's reform proposals was that "the 'accident' requirement be
dropped as a test for compensability." 271 The Commission noted that inter-
pretations of the injury by accident requirement such as North Carolina's had
served as arbitrary bars to compensation for work-related injuries and that
elimination of such constructions would help realize the Commission's goal
that there "should be no legal impediments to full coverage of all injuries
which are work-related." 272
It is time to change North Carolina's construction of the injury by acci-
263. Vause v. Vause Farm Equip. Co., 233 N.C. 88, 92, 63 S.E.2d 173, 176 (1951).
264. Id (quoting Cox v. Kansas City Refining Co., 108 Kan. 320, 195 P. 863 (1921)).
265. Larson, Compensation Reform in the United States, in OCCUPATIONAL DISABILITY AND
PUBLIC POLICY 14 (E. Cheit & M. Gordon eds. 1963).
266. For a collection of criticisms, see Berkowitz, Aspects of the Economics of Workmen's Com-
pensation, in REPORT OF THE NATIONAL WORKSHOP ON REHABILITATION AND WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION 13-14 (1971).
267. Possible alternatives include integrating workers' compensation with other social pro-
grams, see COMPENDIUM, supra note 18, at 299-305; giving injured workers an option to recover
under both the compensation system and a negligence based alternative, see Marcus, Advocating
the Rights ofthe Injured, in OCCUPATIONAL DISABILITY AND PUBLIC POLICY 77 (E. Cheit & M.
Gordon eds. 1963); abandoning workers' compensation and returning to a system of liability
based on fault, see COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 242, at 119-20, and creating a federal workers
compensation system.
268. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, § 27, 84 Stat. 1616.
269. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 242, at 25.
270. Id at 119-21. The Commission recommended that the federal government enact legisla-
tion to guarantee state compliance. Id at 127.
271. Id at 49.
272. Id
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dent requirement. The unquestioned difficulty of determining the precise
medical cause of some degenerative injuries is not a sufficient justification for
maintaining the current across-the-board rule. Continued use of the arbitrary
presumption against the work-relatedness of injuries sustained under usual
circumstances is also not justified in light of the many better alternative meth-
ods for determining causation. All the alternatives discussed in Section V are
based on more reasonable public policy positions and more sensible interpre-
tations of the language of the statute than the current construction. The lib-
eral, medical cause in fact test is a fair and just alternative method of
determining causation that would not open the floodgates to unjustified
claims. If it is believed that an arbitrary scheme is necessary to keep an ulti-
mate check on causation, however, more rational arbitrary alternatives are
available. Under whatever alternative selected, the sustaining of an unex-
pected injury-the accidental result-should alone satisfy the injury by acci-
dent requirement. Necessary causation tests should be imposed under the
"arising out of" component of the statute. The policy favoring liberal con-
struction should dictate that, if any error is to be made in the selection of the
general cadsation test to be used, it should be error in favor of the injured
worker.
Either judicial or legislative action could bring about the necessary
change. Any of the alternatives listed above could be adopted by the court
without the need for legislative action. The opinions indicate, however, that
the North Carolina courts would appreciate new legislative direction. 273 The
legislature could act by adopting the alternative contained in The Council of
State Government's Model Workmen's Compensation Law,274 which omits
the phrase "by accident" from the compensation formula.275 As another alter-
native, the words "or result" could be added directly after the phrase "injury
by accident." Under either of these alternatives, the sustaining of an injury
alone would satisfy the "injury" component of the statute. Causation would
be tested only under other components of the statute.
In surveying the current injury by accident rule, Justice Ervin's admoni-
tion about persisting in error should be remembered. 276 The claims of injured
workers such as Thomas Pulley should not be denied because of harsh, narrow
requirements that have little relationship to causation. The rationale of the
case for compensation has never been presented better than in Justice
Seawell's quotation in Edwards v. Piedmont Publishing Co. from the opinion of
the House of Lords in the seminal workers' compensation case, Fenton v.
Thorley:
"It does seem to be extraordinary that anybody should suppose that
• . . Parliament could have intended to exclude from the benefit of
the Act some injuries ordinarily described as 'accidents' which be-
273. See, eg., text accompanying note 153 supra.
274. THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AND REHABILI-
TATION LAW (2d ed. 1973).
275. Id § 2(a).
276. See text accompanying note 159 supra.
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yond all others merit favorable consideration in the interest of work-
men and employers alike. A man injures himself by doing some
stupid thing, and it is called an accident.... A man injures himself
suddenly and unexpectedly by throwing all his might and all his
strength and all his energy into his work by doing his very best and
utmost for his employer, not sparing himself or taking thought of
what may come upon him, and then he is told that his case is outside
the Act because he exerted himself deliberately, and there was an
entire lack of the fortuitous element! I cannot think that this is
right." 277
DANIEL R. POLLITT
277. Edwards v. Piedmont Publishing Co., 227 N.C. 184, 191-92, 41 S.E.2d 592, 597 (1947)
(Seawell, J., concurring) (quoting Fenton v. J. Thorley & Co. [1903] A.C. 443).
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